基于区块链技术的需求预测与更新

Zhongbao Zhou
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摘要

本文旨在通过区块链技术解决供应链中的信息不对称问题。我们考虑一个drop shopping供应链,它包括一个供应商和一个有更准确需求预测的零售商。零售商的需求预测主要基于私有区块链上的过去销售数据。零售商可以选择加入区块链联盟,可靠地共享需求预测。我们考虑了三种加入区块链联盟成本固定的信息共享场景:零售商承担全部固定成本,供应商通过提供固定补贴承担部分成本,供应商通过提供批发折扣承担部分成本。在这三种情况下,我们都找到了阈值策略下的完美贝叶斯均衡。数值模拟主要表明,供应商的直接补贴和批发折扣策略会增加零售商的加入概率,但会损害零售商的期望利润。随着固定成本的增加,零售商和供应链系统的预期利润都是先降低后增加,最后收敛到一个常数。当供应商的产品利润较低时,零售商的加入意愿较高。供应商只有在成本处于中等水平时才愿意提供补贴。当固定成本处于较大范围时,零售商宁愿在信息不完整时做出去中心化决策,也不愿加入联盟区块链。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Demand Forecast and Update Based on Blockchain Technology
This paper aims to solve the problem of information asymmetry in the supply chain through block-chain technology. We consider a drop shopping supply chain, which includes one supplier and one retailer who has more accurate demand forecast. The demand forecast of the retailer is mainly based on past selling data on a private block-chain. And the retailer can choose to join a consortium block-chain to share the demand forecast credibly. We consider three types of information sharing scenarios with a fixed cost of joining the consortium block-chain: retailer bears all the fixed cost, supplier bears part of the cost by providing a fixed subsidy, supplier bears part of the cost by providing a wholesale discount. We find the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) with threshold strategy in all three scenarios. And the numerical simulations mainly show that, the supplier’s direct subsidy and wholesale discount strategy will increase the retailer’s joining probability but hurt her expected profits. As the fixed cost increases, the expected profit both the retailer and the supply chain system will decrease at first but increase later, and finally converge to a constant. When product margin for the supplier is lower, the retailer’s willingness to join is higher. The supplier is only willing to provide subsidies when the cost is around a medium level. When the fixed cost is in a large range, the retailer will rather make a decentralized decision in in-completing information than join the consortium block-chain.
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