一些第一轮凯撒候选人的密码分析

ISC Int. J. Inf. Secur. Pub Date : 2016-01-06 DOI:10.22042/ISECURE.2016.7.2.5

J. Alizadeh, M. Aref, N. Bagheri, H. Sadeghi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

AES _ CMCCv1、AVALANCHEv1、CLOCv1和SILCv1是第一轮CAESAR的四个候选项。在FSE 2014中提出了CLOCv1，并在此基础上设计了SILCv1，目的是优化硬件实现成本。本文对这些候选者的结构缺陷进行了研究。我们提出了区分针对AES _ CMCCv1的攻击，其查询复杂度为2次，成功概率接近1;区分针对CLOCv1和SILCv1的攻击，其查询复杂度为0 (2n/2)次，成功概率为0.63，其中n为消息块的位长度。此外，本文还提出了一种针对AVALANCHEv1的伪造攻击，该攻击只需要查询一次，成功概率为1。这些攻击暴露了这些第一轮候选人在结构上的弱点，以及他们安全声明的不准确性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Cryptanalysis of some first round CAESAR candidates

AES _ CMCCv1, AVALANCHEv1, CLOCv1, and SILCv1 are four candidates of the first round of CAESAR. CLOCv1 is presented in FSE 2014 and SILCv1 is designed upon it with the aim of optimizing the hardware implementation cost. In this paper, structural weaknesses of these candidates are studied. We present distinguishing attacks against AES _ CMCCv1 with the complexity of two queries and the success probability of almost 1, and distinguishing attacks on CLOCv1 and SILCv1 with the complexity of O(2n/2) queries and the success probability of 0.63, in which n is bit length of message blocks. In addition, a forgery attack is presented against AVALANCHEv1 which requires only one query and has the success probability of 1. The attacks reveal weaknesses in the structure of these first round candidates and inaccuracy of their security claims.

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ISC Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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