{"title":"环境政策制定的战略授权:更正和评论","authors":"K. Hattori","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1009425","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this comment is to correct some mathematical and implicational errors in Roelfsema [in J.Environ.Econom.Management 53, 270-275 (2007)] who points out a new theoretical possibility explaining the discrepancy between theory and evidence about 'the race to the bottom' in non-cooperative environmental policy making. We also mention the primary factor in determining the effects of strategic voting and the applications of Roelfsema's results for another setting of the model.","PeriodicalId":219371,"journal":{"name":"SEIN Environmental Impacts of Business eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic Delegation of Environmental Policy Making: Corrections and Comments\",\"authors\":\"K. Hattori\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1009425\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The purpose of this comment is to correct some mathematical and implicational errors in Roelfsema [in J.Environ.Econom.Management 53, 270-275 (2007)] who points out a new theoretical possibility explaining the discrepancy between theory and evidence about 'the race to the bottom' in non-cooperative environmental policy making. We also mention the primary factor in determining the effects of strategic voting and the applications of Roelfsema's results for another setting of the model.\",\"PeriodicalId\":219371,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"SEIN Environmental Impacts of Business eJournal\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-08-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"SEIN Environmental Impacts of Business eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1009425\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SEIN Environmental Impacts of Business eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1009425","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic Delegation of Environmental Policy Making: Corrections and Comments
The purpose of this comment is to correct some mathematical and implicational errors in Roelfsema [in J.Environ.Econom.Management 53, 270-275 (2007)] who points out a new theoretical possibility explaining the discrepancy between theory and evidence about 'the race to the bottom' in non-cooperative environmental policy making. We also mention the primary factor in determining the effects of strategic voting and the applications of Roelfsema's results for another setting of the model.
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