Corporate Governance and the Diversification Discount: The Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

We examine whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a major role in reducing the diversification discount and enhancing internal capital markets efficiency. The act proposes new rules and regulations on financial practice and reshapes corporate governance to insure alignment of incentives between corporate insiders and investors. We check the relationship between corporate governance variables and the diversification discount. Finally, we conclude the indirect effects of the act in enhancing efficiency and reducing the diversification discount. We find that the level of corporate governance, especially CEO power, affects the efficient allocation of resources and the diversification discount correspondingly. However, we find that the sensitivity of the diversification discount to CEO power decreases significantly after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which implies that the restrictions and regulations passed by the act enhance corporate governance and limit the misallocation of resources and the diversification discount respectively.