纳什实现的资源分配与生产网络问题

2008 Information Theory and Applications Workshop Pub Date : 2008-08-15 DOI:10.1109/ITA.2008.4601079

T. Stoenescu, J. Ledyard

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引用次数: 7

摘要

我们提供了一种机制来解决在生产存在的情况下，当代理人以产生纳什均衡的方式行为时的工程和经济费率分配问题。该机制适用于一系列效用函数，而不仅仅是准线性函数。该机制产生了纳什均衡下的帕累托最优分配。该机制是均衡的，满足自愿参与。

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Nash implementation for resource allocation network problems with production

We provide a mechanism that solves the engineering and economic rate allocation problems in the presence of production when agents behave in a way that produces a Nash Equilibrium. The mechanism works for a range of utility functions, wider than just quasi-linear functions. The mechanism produces a Pareto-optimal allocation at Nash equilibrium. The mechanism is balanced in equilibrium and satisfies voluntary participation.

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2008 Information Theory and Applications Workshop

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