放牧与观察成本

Stephen M. Nei
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引用次数: 1

摘要

当代理从别人那里获得信息时,他们可能会忽略自己的信息,而跟随“群体智慧”。正如Bikhchandani等人(1992)和Banerjee(1992)首先指出的那样,这可能会损害社会的整体学习。在本文中,我考虑了当观察其他代理人的边际成本为恒定时,代理人收集公共信息的策略决策。成本对社会采取正确行动的可能性有模糊的影响。在某些情况下,存在一个中间范围的成本,这个成本足够高,以至于一些代理会选择不模仿其他代理,但又足够低,以至于后来的代理会汇总这些额外的信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Herding with Costs to Observation
When agents are presented with information from others, they might ignore their own information and follow the “wisdom of the crowds”. As first noted by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992), this can harm overall learning in a society. In this paper, I consider the strategic decisions of agents in gathering this public information when there is a constant marginal cost to observing other agents. Costs have an ambiguous effect on the likelihood that society herds on the correct action. In some cases, there is an intermediate range of costs that are high enough that some agents will choose not to imitate others but low enough that later agents will then aggregate this additional information.
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