{"title":"其他关于偏好和互惠:来自实验结果和满意度数据的见解","authors":"L. Becchetti, Vittorio Pelligra, S. Taurino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2698132","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod 'hybrid contribution' multiplayer prisoner's dilemma (the Vote-with-the-Wallet game). Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we define as strong cooperators) are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice, irrespective of the material pay- off they obtain. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the behavioral and self-reported data.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Other Regarding Preferences and Reciprocity: Insights from Experimental Findings and Satisfaction Data\",\"authors\":\"L. Becchetti, Vittorio Pelligra, S. Taurino\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2698132\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod 'hybrid contribution' multiplayer prisoner's dilemma (the Vote-with-the-Wallet game). Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we define as strong cooperators) are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice, irrespective of the material pay- off they obtain. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the behavioral and self-reported data.\",\"PeriodicalId\":416571,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-12-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698132\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698132","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Other Regarding Preferences and Reciprocity: Insights from Experimental Findings and Satisfaction Data
We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod 'hybrid contribution' multiplayer prisoner's dilemma (the Vote-with-the-Wallet game). Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we define as strong cooperators) are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice, irrespective of the material pay- off they obtain. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the behavioral and self-reported data.