{"title":"暴力的平衡:霸权主权","authors":"J. Hood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2540278","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new and intriguing application of law and economics to public international law. Building upon Calabresi’s seminal paper in which he argues that tort law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of negative externalities, I argue that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence. Students of public international law may recognize intuitively that this has been the aim of the legal regime for much of the last century, but this approach to public international law opens that field to a more systematic study whose goal is to find and maintain the acceptable market equilibrium of violence. While arguing that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence, I claim that the legal regime by itself is inadequate to prevent the overproduction of violence. In fact, history teaches us as much. States that would produce unacceptable kinds and quantities of violence must be deterred by superior force. Military force or threat of force serves as a barrier to states’ entry into what can be thought as a market for armed conflict, for violence. In order to maintain a barrier to entry, the force must be hegemonic or have some monopoly on violence. In a sense, it must be the world’s policeman. Only by working in tandem with this hegemonic force can the legal regime ensure that violence does not exceed the bounds of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Equilibrium of Violence: Hegemon Sovereignty\",\"authors\":\"J. Hood\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2540278\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents a new and intriguing application of law and economics to public international law. Building upon Calabresi’s seminal paper in which he argues that tort law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of negative externalities, I argue that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence. Students of public international law may recognize intuitively that this has been the aim of the legal regime for much of the last century, but this approach to public international law opens that field to a more systematic study whose goal is to find and maintain the acceptable market equilibrium of violence. While arguing that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence, I claim that the legal regime by itself is inadequate to prevent the overproduction of violence. In fact, history teaches us as much. States that would produce unacceptable kinds and quantities of violence must be deterred by superior force. Military force or threat of force serves as a barrier to states’ entry into what can be thought as a market for armed conflict, for violence. In order to maintain a barrier to entry, the force must be hegemonic or have some monopoly on violence. In a sense, it must be the world’s policeman. Only by working in tandem with this hegemonic force can the legal regime ensure that violence does not exceed the bounds of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.\",\"PeriodicalId\":129013,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-12-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540278\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540278","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a new and intriguing application of law and economics to public international law. Building upon Calabresi’s seminal paper in which he argues that tort law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of negative externalities, I argue that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence. Students of public international law may recognize intuitively that this has been the aim of the legal regime for much of the last century, but this approach to public international law opens that field to a more systematic study whose goal is to find and maintain the acceptable market equilibrium of violence. While arguing that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence, I claim that the legal regime by itself is inadequate to prevent the overproduction of violence. In fact, history teaches us as much. States that would produce unacceptable kinds and quantities of violence must be deterred by superior force. Military force or threat of force serves as a barrier to states’ entry into what can be thought as a market for armed conflict, for violence. In order to maintain a barrier to entry, the force must be hegemonic or have some monopoly on violence. In a sense, it must be the world’s policeman. Only by working in tandem with this hegemonic force can the legal regime ensure that violence does not exceed the bounds of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.