暴力的平衡:霸权主权

J. Hood
{"title":"暴力的平衡:霸权主权","authors":"J. Hood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2540278","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new and intriguing application of law and economics to public international law. Building upon Calabresi’s seminal paper in which he argues that tort law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of negative externalities, I argue that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence. Students of public international law may recognize intuitively that this has been the aim of the legal regime for much of the last century, but this approach to public international law opens that field to a more systematic study whose goal is to find and maintain the acceptable market equilibrium of violence. While arguing that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence, I claim that the legal regime by itself is inadequate to prevent the overproduction of violence. In fact, history teaches us as much. States that would produce unacceptable kinds and quantities of violence must be deterred by superior force. Military force or threat of force serves as a barrier to states’ entry into what can be thought as a market for armed conflict, for violence. In order to maintain a barrier to entry, the force must be hegemonic or have some monopoly on violence. In a sense, it must be the world’s policeman. Only by working in tandem with this hegemonic force can the legal regime ensure that violence does not exceed the bounds of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.","PeriodicalId":129013,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Equilibrium of Violence: Hegemon Sovereignty\",\"authors\":\"J. Hood\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2540278\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents a new and intriguing application of law and economics to public international law. Building upon Calabresi’s seminal paper in which he argues that tort law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of negative externalities, I argue that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence. Students of public international law may recognize intuitively that this has been the aim of the legal regime for much of the last century, but this approach to public international law opens that field to a more systematic study whose goal is to find and maintain the acceptable market equilibrium of violence. While arguing that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence, I claim that the legal regime by itself is inadequate to prevent the overproduction of violence. In fact, history teaches us as much. States that would produce unacceptable kinds and quantities of violence must be deterred by superior force. Military force or threat of force serves as a barrier to states’ entry into what can be thought as a market for armed conflict, for violence. In order to maintain a barrier to entry, the force must be hegemonic or have some monopoly on violence. In a sense, it must be the world’s policeman. Only by working in tandem with this hegemonic force can the legal regime ensure that violence does not exceed the bounds of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.\",\"PeriodicalId\":129013,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-12-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540278\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540278","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一个新的和有趣的应用法律和经济学的国际公法。在卡拉布雷西的开创性论文中,他认为侵权法应被视为控制负面外部性的监管制度,在此基础上,我认为国际公法应被视为控制暴力外部性的监管制度。国际公法的学生可能会直观地认识到,这是上个世纪大部分时间法律制度的目标,但这种研究国际公法的方法为更系统的研究开辟了这一领域,其目标是找到并维持可接受的暴力市场平衡。虽然我认为国际公法应被视为控制暴力外部性的监管制度,但我认为法律制度本身不足以防止暴力的过度产生。事实上,历史也教会了我们这么多。必须以优势武力威慑那些将产生不可接受的种类和数量的暴力的国家。军事力量或武力威胁是国家进入武装冲突和暴力市场的障碍。为了保持进入的障碍,该力量必须是霸权的,或者对暴力有某种垄断。从某种意义上说,它必须是世界警察。只有与这种霸权力量协同工作,法律制度才能确保暴力不超出法与战和法与战的界限。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Equilibrium of Violence: Hegemon Sovereignty
This paper presents a new and intriguing application of law and economics to public international law. Building upon Calabresi’s seminal paper in which he argues that tort law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of negative externalities, I argue that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence. Students of public international law may recognize intuitively that this has been the aim of the legal regime for much of the last century, but this approach to public international law opens that field to a more systematic study whose goal is to find and maintain the acceptable market equilibrium of violence. While arguing that public international law should be regarded as a regulatory regime for the control of externalities of violence, I claim that the legal regime by itself is inadequate to prevent the overproduction of violence. In fact, history teaches us as much. States that would produce unacceptable kinds and quantities of violence must be deterred by superior force. Military force or threat of force serves as a barrier to states’ entry into what can be thought as a market for armed conflict, for violence. In order to maintain a barrier to entry, the force must be hegemonic or have some monopoly on violence. In a sense, it must be the world’s policeman. Only by working in tandem with this hegemonic force can the legal regime ensure that violence does not exceed the bounds of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信