{"title":"法律效力:一个推论分析","authors":"G. Sartor","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00388.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual description. Its conceptual function is that of relating certain (alternative sets of) properties a norm may possess to the conclusion that the norm is legally binding, namely, that it deserves to be endorsed and applied in legal reasoning. Legal validity has to be distinguished from other, more demanding, normative ideas, such as moral bindingness or legal optimality.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"16","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Legal Validity: An Inferential Analysis\",\"authors\":\"G. Sartor\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00388.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual description. Its conceptual function is that of relating certain (alternative sets of) properties a norm may possess to the conclusion that the norm is legally binding, namely, that it deserves to be endorsed and applied in legal reasoning. Legal validity has to be distinguished from other, more demanding, normative ideas, such as moral bindingness or legal optimality.\",\"PeriodicalId\":431450,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-05-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"16\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00388.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00388.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
I will argue that the concept of (valid) law is a normative notion, irreducible to any factual description. Its conceptual function is that of relating certain (alternative sets of) properties a norm may possess to the conclusion that the norm is legally binding, namely, that it deserves to be endorsed and applied in legal reasoning. Legal validity has to be distinguished from other, more demanding, normative ideas, such as moral bindingness or legal optimality.
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