{"title":"公共互联网路由注册(IRR)的发展","authors":"Akmal Khan, Hyunchul Kim, T. Kwon, Yanghee Choi","doi":"10.1145/1853079.1853095","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Internet Routing Registries(IRR) have been around for quite some time now[1] with the sole purpose of providing the place for service providers to store their administrative, routing policy information which can be used in case of BGP malicious/misconfiguration events. Are there any useful service providers policy data stored in IRR? What current limited research has able to answer is that \"Quality\" of IRR databases is not known\". By \"Quality\" we mean validity of Internet Number Resources e.g. IPv4, IPv6, AS Number registration, routing policy registration, etc by different network service providers in IRR. We have tried to answer this question by looking into the public IRR datasets of approximately last 4 years [2006--2010]. We have found out that current IRR datasets has a lot to offer than its known/practiced i.e. IRR has approximately 50k full peering available. We are investigating how many peering are in harmony with what BGP is announcing and also which is currently published in well known topology datasets like UCLA IRL[25]. As we believe that if accurate peering can be extracted from IRR than they can provide number of new links which are missing in Internet Topology datasets. It can also reduce the usage of active measurements which in itself is burden on the network. We are also designing BGP Security framework based on IRR which will more accurately perform origin AS authentication as well as inferring the complete policy(what is stored in IRR) of AS.","PeriodicalId":409750,"journal":{"name":"International Conference of Future Internet","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Public internet routing registries (IRR) evolution\",\"authors\":\"Akmal Khan, Hyunchul Kim, T. Kwon, Yanghee Choi\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/1853079.1853095\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Internet Routing Registries(IRR) have been around for quite some time now[1] with the sole purpose of providing the place for service providers to store their administrative, routing policy information which can be used in case of BGP malicious/misconfiguration events. Are there any useful service providers policy data stored in IRR? What current limited research has able to answer is that \\\"Quality\\\" of IRR databases is not known\\\". By \\\"Quality\\\" we mean validity of Internet Number Resources e.g. IPv4, IPv6, AS Number registration, routing policy registration, etc by different network service providers in IRR. We have tried to answer this question by looking into the public IRR datasets of approximately last 4 years [2006--2010]. We have found out that current IRR datasets has a lot to offer than its known/practiced i.e. IRR has approximately 50k full peering available. We are investigating how many peering are in harmony with what BGP is announcing and also which is currently published in well known topology datasets like UCLA IRL[25]. As we believe that if accurate peering can be extracted from IRR than they can provide number of new links which are missing in Internet Topology datasets. It can also reduce the usage of active measurements which in itself is burden on the network. We are also designing BGP Security framework based on IRR which will more accurately perform origin AS authentication as well as inferring the complete policy(what is stored in IRR) of AS.\",\"PeriodicalId\":409750,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Conference of Future Internet\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-06-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Conference of Future Internet\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/1853079.1853095\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Conference of Future Internet","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1853079.1853095","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
Internet Routing registry (IRR)已经存在很长一段时间了[1],其唯一目的是为服务提供商提供存储其管理路由策略信息的场所,这些信息可以在BGP恶意/错误配置事件中使用。IRR中是否存储了有用的服务提供商策略数据?目前有限的研究能够回答的问题是,IRR数据库的“质量”尚不可知。我们所说的“质量”是指IRR中不同网络服务提供商对互联网号码资源的有效性,例如IPv4、IPv6、AS号注册、路由策略注册等。我们试图通过查看近4年[2006- 2010]的公开IRR数据集来回答这个问题。我们发现当前的IRR数据集比已知/实践的有很多可提供的,即IRR有大约5万个完整的对等互联可用。我们正在调查有多少对等网络与BGP所宣布的一致,以及目前在众所周知的拓扑数据集中(如UCLA IRL[25])发布的对等网络。因为我们相信,如果能够从IRR中提取准确的对等,那么它们就可以提供Internet拓扑数据集中缺失的新链路数量。它还可以减少主动测量的使用,主动测量本身就是网络的负担。我们还设计了基于IRR的BGP安全框架,该框架可以更准确地执行源AS认证,并推断出AS的完整策略(存储在IRR中的内容)。
Public internet routing registries (IRR) evolution
Internet Routing Registries(IRR) have been around for quite some time now[1] with the sole purpose of providing the place for service providers to store their administrative, routing policy information which can be used in case of BGP malicious/misconfiguration events. Are there any useful service providers policy data stored in IRR? What current limited research has able to answer is that "Quality" of IRR databases is not known". By "Quality" we mean validity of Internet Number Resources e.g. IPv4, IPv6, AS Number registration, routing policy registration, etc by different network service providers in IRR. We have tried to answer this question by looking into the public IRR datasets of approximately last 4 years [2006--2010]. We have found out that current IRR datasets has a lot to offer than its known/practiced i.e. IRR has approximately 50k full peering available. We are investigating how many peering are in harmony with what BGP is announcing and also which is currently published in well known topology datasets like UCLA IRL[25]. As we believe that if accurate peering can be extracted from IRR than they can provide number of new links which are missing in Internet Topology datasets. It can also reduce the usage of active measurements which in itself is burden on the network. We are also designing BGP Security framework based on IRR which will more accurately perform origin AS authentication as well as inferring the complete policy(what is stored in IRR) of AS.