{"title":"最优企业养老金政策:一个统一的框架","authors":"Katarzyna Romaniuk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1937186","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a general continuous-time framework for defining optimal corporate pension policy. Interactions between the firm's optimal investment and financing policies and the defined benefit pension plan optimal portfolio strategy are studied. We prove that the three decision rules are driven by speculation and hedging motives, the latter concerning in each case both the pension plan and firm variables. We emphasize that in normal times the optimal pension portfolio rule from the equity holders' perspective is acceptable to both the participants and PBGC. Yet it is no longer the case when the firm approaches financial distress. The PBGC should then exert a much stronger control than today exerted on the sponsoring company to prevent the further deterioration of the Corporation's financial status.","PeriodicalId":236420,"journal":{"name":"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Corporate Pension Policy: A Unified Framework\",\"authors\":\"Katarzyna Romaniuk\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1937186\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper develops a general continuous-time framework for defining optimal corporate pension policy. Interactions between the firm's optimal investment and financing policies and the defined benefit pension plan optimal portfolio strategy are studied. We prove that the three decision rules are driven by speculation and hedging motives, the latter concerning in each case both the pension plan and firm variables. We emphasize that in normal times the optimal pension portfolio rule from the equity holders' perspective is acceptable to both the participants and PBGC. Yet it is no longer the case when the firm approaches financial distress. The PBGC should then exert a much stronger control than today exerted on the sponsoring company to prevent the further deterioration of the Corporation's financial status.\",\"PeriodicalId\":236420,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-09-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937186\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"POL: Human Resource Management Models (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937186","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Optimal Corporate Pension Policy: A Unified Framework
This paper develops a general continuous-time framework for defining optimal corporate pension policy. Interactions between the firm's optimal investment and financing policies and the defined benefit pension plan optimal portfolio strategy are studied. We prove that the three decision rules are driven by speculation and hedging motives, the latter concerning in each case both the pension plan and firm variables. We emphasize that in normal times the optimal pension portfolio rule from the equity holders' perspective is acceptable to both the participants and PBGC. Yet it is no longer the case when the firm approaches financial distress. The PBGC should then exert a much stronger control than today exerted on the sponsoring company to prevent the further deterioration of the Corporation's financial status.