该假说的反对者

B. Alger
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第10章回顾了三位杰出科学家的著作,他们拒绝将假设作为科学思考和研究的基础。斯图尔特·费尔斯坦(Stuart Firestein)强烈反对假设,支持好奇心驱动的科学,这是一种故意无结构的自由形式模式。大卫·格拉斯的提问和模型构建项目结构严谨,具有归纳主义的精神;他反对假设,支持与假设不同的“模型”。费尔斯坦和格拉斯都接受评估科学真理的经验主义标准,并相信科学研究是在提出可检验的问题的基础上进行的。大卫·多伊奇(David Deutsch)是一位理论物理学家,原则上,他的先进思想在经验上是不可检验的,由于经验可检验性是科学假设检验的关键,他也拒绝接受假设。他的节目叫《猜想与批判》。与其他两位批评家不同,多伊奇对卡尔·波普尔所推进的科学思维过程表示同情,但他认为,科学要超越经验主义的限制,必须取代波普尔的纲领。本章表明,假设的每一种替代方法与假设的不兼容性,在很大程度上是基于对假设科学本质的误读或误用。相反的建议并不是拒绝假设的理由,事实上,它可以与它们舒适地共存。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Opponents of the Hypothesis
Chapter 10 reviews the writings of three prominent scientists who reject the hypothesis as the basis for scientific thinking and research. Stuart Firestein is virulently anti-hypothesis and champions Curiosity-Driven science, a free-form mode which is deliberately unstructured. David Glass’s program of Questioning and Model-Building is rigidly structured and inductivist in spirit; he rejects the hypothesis in favor of “models” that he distinguishes from hypotheses. Both Firestein and Glass accept the empiricist standard for assessing scientific truth and believe that a scientific investigation proceeds on the basis of asking testable questions. David Deutsch is a theoretical physicist whose advanced ideas are, in principle, empirically untestable and, since empirical testability is the key to scientific hypothesis testing, he also rejects the hypothesis. His program is called Conjectures and Criticism. Unlike the other two critics, Deutsch is sympathetic to the scientific thinking process that Karl Popper advanced, but feels that Popper’s program must be superseded for science to get beyond the constraints of empiricism. The chapter shows that the supposed incompatibilities of each of the alternative approaches with the hypothesis are largely based on misrepresentations or misapplications of the nature of hypothesis-based science. The counterproposals are not grounds for rejecting the hypothesis, which can in fact coexist comfortably with them.
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