收益不确定下资金受限供应商的融资策略

Hongjun Peng, Tao Pang
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引用次数: 17

摘要

我们考虑一个由供应商和分销商组成的供应链,其中供应商面临资金约束和生产率不确定性。为了解决资金约束问题,我们提出了一种带有风险补偿的预付款机制(APRC),即分销商向供应商支付预付款,供应商提供价格折扣以补偿供应商的破产风险。结果表明,在APRC机制下,整个供应链在利润和最优策略方面的表现与不存在资本约束时一样好。因此,APRC是解决供应商资金约束问题的有效方法。此外,当赤字较大时,APRC提供了另一种融资安排,可以为双方带来更高的利润。另一个非常有趣的发现是,当资金赤字较小时,供应商可以更好地利用银行贷款融资,尽管在这种情况下需要支付更高的利率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Financing Strategies for a Capital-Constrained Supplier under Yield Uncertainty
We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a distributor, in which the supplier has a capital constraint and faces productivity yield uncertainty. To solve the capital constraint problem, we propose an advance payment with risk compensation (APRC) mechanism, under which the distributor finances the supplier with an advance payment, and the supplier provides a price discount to compensate the distributor for the supplier's bankruptcy risk. The optimal solutions are derived under the APRC mechanism and the results indicate that under the APRC, the whole supply chain performs as well as if there is no capital constraint, in terms of profits and optimal strategies. Therefore, the APRC is an efficient solution for the supplier's capital constraint issue. In addition, when the deficit is big, the APRC provides an alternative financing arrangement and it can bring higher profits for both parties. Another very interesting finding is that, when the capital deficit is small, the supplier can do better with the bank loan financing, despite that a higher interest rate needs to be paid in this case.
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