Loyal to the Executive: The Effect of State Capacity on Local Horizontal Accountability

The literature suggests that state capacity has a reinforcing effect on democracy. This paper focuses on local democracy and draws on the comparative method to evaluate how bureaucratic capacity and usability can affect a critical component of democracy—horizontal (or intrastate) accountability. Contrasting with the literature, this paper argues that, even in democratic regimes, state capacity can discourage accountability agents that are elected through popular vote. Bureaucracies that are well funded, highly professionalized, and usable can give local executives an ample capacity to discourage accountability agents (municipal councils). When local bureaucracies lack these characteristics, executives can still manage to influence horizontal accountability by exchanging council members’ support for access to municipal resources. Municipal councils’ inclination towards accountability is greater when local bureaucracies are highly capable but not usable. In these cases, the local executive lacks influence on council members’ electoral support and, therefore, on their disposition for accountability.