联邦授权但地方管理:根据《清洁空气法》减少空气污染的政治差异

Zach Raff, Jason M. Walter, Andrew G. Meyer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在美国,《清洁空气法》(Clean Air Act, CAA)的大部分管理权都下放给了各州。各州主要负责国家环境空气质量标准(NAAQS)的管理,该标准对位于“未达到”标准地区的固定排放源施加技术和其他要求。在本文中,我们研究了不同政治制度下CAA技术要求在州一级实施的差异。我们使用回归不连续设计来估计每个州的政治领导对电力公司新的空气污染减排技术的支出和类型的影响。我们发现,在符合NAAQS的地区,州长的政治派别对两种结果都没有影响。然而,在未达到目标的地区,相对于民主党州长的州,共和党州长的控制减少了公用事业公司新的空气污染减排资本支出和安装“最佳”氮氧化物减排技术的可能性。最后,我们提供的证据表明,在民主党州长领导的未达标地区,公用事业公司采用减排技术的额外成本超过了这些地区减少氮氧化物排放的额外健康效益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Federally Mandated but Locally Administered: Political Differences in Air Pollution Abatement Under the Clean Air Act
In the US, much of the authority to administer the Clean Air Act (CAA) is delegated to indi-vidual states. States are responsible primarily for the administration of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which impose technological and other requirements on stationary emission sources located in areas in “nonattainment” with the standards. In this paper, we examine the differential state level implementation of the CAA’s technological requirements across political regimes. We use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of each state’s political leadership on the expenditures and types of new air pollution abatement technology at electric utili-ties. We find that the political affiliation of a state’s governor has no effect on either outcome in ar-eas that meet the NAAQS. However, in nonattainment areas, Republican gubernatorial control de-creases utilities’ new air pollution abatement capital expenditures and their probability of installing “first-best” nitrogen oxide abatement technology, relative to utilities in states with a Democratic governor. Finally, we present evidence that the additional costs of abatement technology adoption at utilities in nonattainment areas with a Democratic governor exceed the additional health benefits of decreased NOx emissions in these areas.
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