{"title":"契约理论","authors":"Alexandra Porenta, S. Gerhold","doi":"10.1017/9781108277402.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This course will provide an overview of important a re s of the economics of information. It will cover classic papers of contract design under asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection models), mechanism design and auctions, and, if tim e permits, also reputation. EXAMINATION The examination will consist of weekly problem sets , presentations of articles, and an exam. TOPICS 1. MORAL HAZARD I: STATIC BILATERAL 2. MORAL HAZARD II: MULTIAGENT AND DYNAMIC 3. ADVERSE SELECTION I: STATIC BILATERAL 4. ADVERSE SELECTION II: DYNAMIC, SIGNALING, AND CHEAP TALK 5. AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN","PeriodicalId":309141,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory for Next Generation Wireless and Communication Networks","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contract Theory\",\"authors\":\"Alexandra Porenta, S. Gerhold\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/9781108277402.003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This course will provide an overview of important a re s of the economics of information. It will cover classic papers of contract design under asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection models), mechanism design and auctions, and, if tim e permits, also reputation. EXAMINATION The examination will consist of weekly problem sets , presentations of articles, and an exam. TOPICS 1. MORAL HAZARD I: STATIC BILATERAL 2. MORAL HAZARD II: MULTIAGENT AND DYNAMIC 3. ADVERSE SELECTION I: STATIC BILATERAL 4. ADVERSE SELECTION II: DYNAMIC, SIGNALING, AND CHEAP TALK 5. AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN\",\"PeriodicalId\":309141,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Game Theory for Next Generation Wireless and Communication Networks\",\"volume\":\"19 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Game Theory for Next Generation Wireless and Communication Networks\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108277402.003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Game Theory for Next Generation Wireless and Communication Networks","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108277402.003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This course will provide an overview of important a re s of the economics of information. It will cover classic papers of contract design under asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection models), mechanism design and auctions, and, if tim e permits, also reputation. EXAMINATION The examination will consist of weekly problem sets , presentations of articles, and an exam. TOPICS 1. MORAL HAZARD I: STATIC BILATERAL 2. MORAL HAZARD II: MULTIAGENT AND DYNAMIC 3. ADVERSE SELECTION I: STATIC BILATERAL 4. ADVERSE SELECTION II: DYNAMIC, SIGNALING, AND CHEAP TALK 5. AUCTIONS AND MECHANISM DESIGN
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