{"title":"签署国在环境协议中的领导作用","authors":"Samar Garrab, M. Breton","doi":"10.1109/IREC.2016.7478865","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider in this paper an international agreement for the protection of the environment where signatory countries act as a leader and all other countries are followers. We provide an analytical solution of the problem using dynamic programming and game theory techniques. The aim of this paper is to study the impact of signatories' leadership on the welfare and emission levels of all players by comparing Stackelberg and Nash information structures.","PeriodicalId":190533,"journal":{"name":"2016 7th International Renewable Energy Congress (IREC)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The impact of signatories' leadership in environmental agreements\",\"authors\":\"Samar Garrab, M. Breton\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/IREC.2016.7478865\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider in this paper an international agreement for the protection of the environment where signatory countries act as a leader and all other countries are followers. We provide an analytical solution of the problem using dynamic programming and game theory techniques. The aim of this paper is to study the impact of signatories' leadership on the welfare and emission levels of all players by comparing Stackelberg and Nash information structures.\",\"PeriodicalId\":190533,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2016 7th International Renewable Energy Congress (IREC)\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-03-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2016 7th International Renewable Energy Congress (IREC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/IREC.2016.7478865\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 7th International Renewable Energy Congress (IREC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IREC.2016.7478865","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The impact of signatories' leadership in environmental agreements
We consider in this paper an international agreement for the protection of the environment where signatory countries act as a leader and all other countries are followers. We provide an analytical solution of the problem using dynamic programming and game theory techniques. The aim of this paper is to study the impact of signatories' leadership on the welfare and emission levels of all players by comparing Stackelberg and Nash information structures.
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