{"title":"量化美可的商业模式","authors":"L. Abrams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2849271","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Based on a theory of market share rebates as exclusionary, rather than share-shifting, devices, we have estimated that Medco has a rebate negotiation competitive advantage over smaller entities equal to 4.8% of all ingredient costs. That figure is an estimate of the cost to clients of switching to entities with more transparent business models. In order to offset that loss, smaller entities would have to manage formularies aggressively and produce a generic utilization rate that is 4.8 percentage points greater than Medco’s current 46.8%","PeriodicalId":306463,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Quantifying Medco's Business Model\",\"authors\":\"L. Abrams\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2849271\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Based on a theory of market share rebates as exclusionary, rather than share-shifting, devices, we have estimated that Medco has a rebate negotiation competitive advantage over smaller entities equal to 4.8% of all ingredient costs. That figure is an estimate of the cost to clients of switching to entities with more transparent business models. In order to offset that loss, smaller entities would have to manage formularies aggressively and produce a generic utilization rate that is 4.8 percentage points greater than Medco’s current 46.8%\",\"PeriodicalId\":306463,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"121 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-04-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2849271\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Other Law & Society: Public Law - Antitrust (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2849271","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Based on a theory of market share rebates as exclusionary, rather than share-shifting, devices, we have estimated that Medco has a rebate negotiation competitive advantage over smaller entities equal to 4.8% of all ingredient costs. That figure is an estimate of the cost to clients of switching to entities with more transparent business models. In order to offset that loss, smaller entities would have to manage formularies aggressively and produce a generic utilization rate that is 4.8 percentage points greater than Medco’s current 46.8%