合法性社会困境中的幸福与偏好:直接与间接比较

L. Becchetti, G. Corrado, Vittorio Pelligra, F. Rossetti
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们通过比较直接(基于满意度)和间接(基于选择)方法的结果来研究多人囚徒困境中玩家的偏好。这两种方法都提供了偏好异质性的有力证据,与公共产品组成部分相比,在中位数以上合作的参与者在其选择中受到货币回报的影响较小。合法性框架和从众信息设计的结合进一步降低了这些参与者对非合作选择的相对偏好(满意度)。我们的研究结果支持了一个假设,即(部分)参与者除了标准的自利成分外,还有一个与他者相关的偏好论点,该论点在合法性框架加从众性设计中得到进一步满足。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma: Comparing the Direct and Indirect Approach
We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma by comparing results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-a-vis the public good component. The combination of a legality frame plus a conformity information design reduces further the relative preference (satisfaction) for the non-cooperative choice for such players. Our findings support the hypothesis that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design.
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