量刑裁量权与举证责任

Alex Lundberg
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引用次数: 10

摘要

在美国,法官通常在刑事案件中保留量刑自由裁量权,但在一些州,这种自由裁量权被赋予了陪审团。对陪审团量刑的一种批评是,陪审员会倾向于做出“妥协判决”,即当他们对案件的事实不确定时,他们会做出有罪判决,但从轻量刑。一种简单的预期实用新型表明,任何具有量刑自由裁量权的事实发现者都应该参与在观察上等同于妥协判决的行为。凭直觉,事实发现者会选择比符合罪行的惩罚更轻的判决,因为他想要减轻错误定罪的潜在成本;反过来,错误定罪的成本较低导致他降低了证明标准。尽管对陪审团判决持批评态度的人直觉地认为存在妥协的风险,但法官席审判也会给法官带来同样的风险。另外,陪审团审判的形式(陪审团裁决,法官判决)可以减少妥协的风险,如果陪审团被拒绝惩罚信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sentencing Discretion and Burdens of Proof
In the US, judges typically retain sentencing discretion in criminal cases, but in some states this discretion is given to juries. One criticism of jury sentencing is that jurors will be tempted to issue “compromise verdicts,” where they return a guilty verdict but a light sentence when they are uncertain about the facts of a case. A simple expected utility model shows that any fact finder with sentencing discretion should engage in behavior that is observationally equivalent to a compromise verdict. Intuitively, the fact finder chooses a more lenient sentence than the punishment that fits the crime because he wants to mitigate the potential cost of a wrongful conviction; in turn, a lower cost of a wrongful conviction leads him to reduce his standard of proof. Although critics of jury sentencing intuit the risk of compromise, a bench trial poses the same risk for a judge. Alternatively, the jury trial format (jury verdict, judge sentence) can lessen the risk of compromise if juries are denied punishment information.
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