协作通信的无策略拍卖机制SAIL

Zhenzhe Zheng, Juntao Wang, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen
{"title":"协作通信的无策略拍卖机制SAIL","authors":"Zhenzhe Zheng, Juntao Wang, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen","doi":"10.1109/ICPADS.2013.60","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cooperative communication is a new fashion to alleviate the low channel utilization and signal fading problems in today's wireless network. The success of cooperative communication heavily depends on the efficient assignment of relay resource. Auction theory has been applied successfully to allocate limited resources in wireless network for decades. However, most of the existing auction mechanisms restricted buyers to use simple bidding language, which greatly lowers the social welfare and relay assignment efficiency. In this paper, we model the relay assignment as a combinatorial auction with flexible bidding language and propose SAIL, which is a Strategy-proof and Approximately effIcient combinatoriaL auction for relay assignment in cooperative communication. We show analytically that SAIL is strategy-proof and achieves approximate efficient social welfare. Furthermore, we present evaluation results to show that SAIL achieves a good system performance in terms of social welfare, buyer satisfaction and relay utilization.","PeriodicalId":160979,"journal":{"name":"2013 International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"SAIL: A Strategy-Proof Auction Mechanism for Cooperative Communication\",\"authors\":\"Zhenzhe Zheng, Juntao Wang, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICPADS.2013.60\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cooperative communication is a new fashion to alleviate the low channel utilization and signal fading problems in today's wireless network. The success of cooperative communication heavily depends on the efficient assignment of relay resource. Auction theory has been applied successfully to allocate limited resources in wireless network for decades. However, most of the existing auction mechanisms restricted buyers to use simple bidding language, which greatly lowers the social welfare and relay assignment efficiency. In this paper, we model the relay assignment as a combinatorial auction with flexible bidding language and propose SAIL, which is a Strategy-proof and Approximately effIcient combinatoriaL auction for relay assignment in cooperative communication. We show analytically that SAIL is strategy-proof and achieves approximate efficient social welfare. Furthermore, we present evaluation results to show that SAIL achieves a good system performance in terms of social welfare, buyer satisfaction and relay utilization.\",\"PeriodicalId\":160979,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2013 International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems\",\"volume\":\"103 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2013 International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPADS.2013.60\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPADS.2013.60","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5

摘要

协作通信是解决当前无线网络中信道利用率低和信号衰落问题的一种新的通信方式。协作通信的成功与否在很大程度上取决于中继资源的有效分配。几十年来,拍卖理论已经成功地应用于无线网络有限资源的分配。然而,现有的拍卖机制大多限制了买家使用简单的竞价语言,这大大降低了社会福利和中继分配效率。本文将中继分配建模为具有灵活竞价语言的组合拍卖,提出了一种用于协作通信中继分配的策略证明的近似高效组合拍卖SAIL。通过分析表明,SAIL是不受策略约束的,并能实现近似有效的社会福利。此外,我们还提供了评估结果,表明SAIL在社会福利,买家满意度和继电器利用率方面取得了良好的系统性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
SAIL: A Strategy-Proof Auction Mechanism for Cooperative Communication
Cooperative communication is a new fashion to alleviate the low channel utilization and signal fading problems in today's wireless network. The success of cooperative communication heavily depends on the efficient assignment of relay resource. Auction theory has been applied successfully to allocate limited resources in wireless network for decades. However, most of the existing auction mechanisms restricted buyers to use simple bidding language, which greatly lowers the social welfare and relay assignment efficiency. In this paper, we model the relay assignment as a combinatorial auction with flexible bidding language and propose SAIL, which is a Strategy-proof and Approximately effIcient combinatoriaL auction for relay assignment in cooperative communication. We show analytically that SAIL is strategy-proof and achieves approximate efficient social welfare. Furthermore, we present evaluation results to show that SAIL achieves a good system performance in terms of social welfare, buyer satisfaction and relay utilization.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信