{"title":"概念混淆:英国法院的机关、代理人和身份","authors":"S. Watson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1910999","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to address some of the more conceptual questions about companies sitting behind two recent cases. Lord Scott in the House of Lords described Stone & Rolls as difficult but the facts in Stone & Rolls and Safeway could hardly be simpler. Stone & Rolls involved a claim by a fraudulent one-man company against its auditors for negligence for failing to detect its fraud. In Safeway a company was convicted of competition law breaches due to the actions of some of its employees and directors. The company was unsuccessful in an action against those directors and employees on the basis that the wrongdoing employees and directors were identified as the mind of the company and therefore exempt from liability. It is argued that the apparent complexities (and the occasional counter-intuitive outcomes) expose a fundamental misconception about the structure of companies. The first misapplication was brought about by the unwillingness in U.K. company law to acknowledge the place of the board in the company. The rules of attribution as set down by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian Global Funds and applied correctly necessarily mean that the board collectively and the shareholders collectively sit at the core of the company. When directors are acting collectively as part of the board, they are not the agents of the company. Their knowledge as part of the board is attributed to the company by the primary rules of attribution. Absent statutory provisions that override company law principles, or breach of duty, the board of directors collectively should therefore be immune from liability when they act in that role. 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引用次数: 16
摘要
本文旨在解决最近两起案件背后的公司的一些概念性问题。英国上议院的斯科特勋爵(Lord Scott)形容滚石很难,但滚石和西夫韦的情况再简单不过了。滚石公司涉及一个欺诈性的一人公司对其审计人员的索赔,因为他们未能发现其欺诈行为。在西夫韦,一家公司因其部分员工和董事的行为而被判违反竞争法。公司在起诉这些董事和员工的诉讼中败诉,理由是这些不法行为的员工和董事被认定为公司的精神支柱,因此免于承担责任。有人认为,这种表面上的复杂性(以及偶尔出现的反直觉的结果)暴露了人们对公司结构的根本误解。第一个误用是由于英国公司法不愿意承认董事会在公司中的地位。霍夫曼勋爵(Lord Hoffmann)在子午线全球基金(Meridian Global Funds)中制定并正确应用的归因规则必然意味着,董事会和股东集体坐在公司的核心位置。当董事们作为董事会的一部分集体行动时,他们不是公司的代理人。他们作为董事会成员的知识根据归因的基本规则归于公司。如果没有凌驾于公司法原则之上的法律规定,或者没有违反职责的行为,那么董事会在担任这一角色时,应该集体免于承担责任。但是,在接受集体行动的董事会成员作为一般原则免于承担责任时,也必须承认,作为董事的个人可能与公司有许多不同的法律关系,这些关系在时间意义上是同时发生或顺序发生的。第二个误用是对特殊归因规则的误用。出于规则的目的,通常是法定的,特殊的归因规则可以凌驾于公司法的原则之上,这意味着公司可以对公司代理人的知情和行为负主要责任。关键的是,与认定原则不同的是,由特殊的归因规则所带来的主要责任仅为该法定规则的目的;它不会改变公司的基本结构。
Conceptual Confusion: Organs, Agents and Identity in the English Courts
This article aims to address some of the more conceptual questions about companies sitting behind two recent cases. Lord Scott in the House of Lords described Stone & Rolls as difficult but the facts in Stone & Rolls and Safeway could hardly be simpler. Stone & Rolls involved a claim by a fraudulent one-man company against its auditors for negligence for failing to detect its fraud. In Safeway a company was convicted of competition law breaches due to the actions of some of its employees and directors. The company was unsuccessful in an action against those directors and employees on the basis that the wrongdoing employees and directors were identified as the mind of the company and therefore exempt from liability. It is argued that the apparent complexities (and the occasional counter-intuitive outcomes) expose a fundamental misconception about the structure of companies. The first misapplication was brought about by the unwillingness in U.K. company law to acknowledge the place of the board in the company. The rules of attribution as set down by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian Global Funds and applied correctly necessarily mean that the board collectively and the shareholders collectively sit at the core of the company. When directors are acting collectively as part of the board, they are not the agents of the company. Their knowledge as part of the board is attributed to the company by the primary rules of attribution. Absent statutory provisions that override company law principles, or breach of duty, the board of directors collectively should therefore be immune from liability when they act in that role. But when accepting that the members of a board that acts collectively are, as a general principle, immune from liability, it is crucial to accept also that individuals who are directors are likely to have many different legal relationships with a company that in a temporal sense occur concurrently or sequentially. The second misapplication was of the special rules of attribution. For the purposes of a rule, usually statutory, the special rules of attribution can override the principles of company law meaning that the company can be primarily liable for the knowledge and actions of a corporate agent. Crucially though, and unlike, the doctrine of identification, the primary liability brought about by the special rules of attribution is only for the purposes of that statutory rule; it does not change the underlying structure of the company.