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引用次数: 13
摘要
所考虑的中心论点是哈维·埃弗奇(Harvey Averch)和利兰·l·约翰逊(Leland L. Johnson)提出的命题，即“如果监管机构允许的回报率大于资本成本，但低于企业在不受监管约束的情况下自由实现利润最大化时所享有的回报率，那么企业将用资本替代其他生产要素，并在成本不是最小的产出下运营。”
The Averch and Johnson proposition: a critical analysis
The central thesis under consideration is the proposition by Messrs. Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson that "if the rate of return allowed by the regulatory agency is greater than the cost of capital but is less than the rate of return that would be enjoyed by the firm were it free to maximize profit without regulatory restraint, then the firm will substitute capital for the other factor of production and operate at an output where cost is not minimized."
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