第三方审计对合规和腐败的影响:基于政策实验的证据

Prasanna Tantri
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引用次数: 0

摘要

通过印度的政策实验,我们研究了第三方审计对税收合规的影响。采用广义差中差方法,我们发现在没有第三方审计的制度下,纳税增长率高出58个百分点。事实上,税收的差异增长与可自由支配费用的差异增长呈负相关,而且受到待遇的公司也没有任何实际增长,这暗示着勾结和腐败。我们的结果符合一系列安慰剂测试,吸收时变和时不变的不可观察因素,并显示基于预期线的异质性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Impact of Third Party Audits on Compliance and Corruption: Evidence Using a Policy Experiment
Using a policy experiment in India, we examine the impact of a third party audit on tax compliance. Employing the generalized difference-in-difference methodology, we find that growth in tax payment is 58 percentage points higher under a regime with no third party audit. The fact that the differential growth in tax is negatively associated with differential growth in discretionary expenses and also absence of any real growth of treated firms, suggestively indicate collusion and corruption. Our results hold up-to a battery of placebo tests, absorption of time varying and time invariant unobservable factors and, display heterogeneity based on expected lines.
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