企业破产的代价:我们所知甚少

S. Lubben
{"title":"企业破产的代价:我们所知甚少","authors":"S. Lubben","doi":"10.4337/9781781007884.00019","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For almost as long as there have been bankruptcy laws, there have been complaints that the primary beneficiaries of these laws are insiders who administer the bankruptcy system. In recent decades, this line of criticism has carried with it an implicit criticism of bankruptcy courts, who are urged to more aggressively police the costs of bankruptcy. Indeed, at least one recent critic has unkindly suggested that the failure of the courts to control bankruptcy costs is the result of a corrupt bargain between bankruptcy courts and practitioners. Rarely addressed is why bankruptcy courts regulate professional costs at all. In most areas of American law, a professional is accountable solely to its client. Complaints about excessive cost might result in a separate malpractice action, but a client who thinks they have been overcharged for the defense of their speeding ticket will find little relief in traffic court. Why is bankruptcy different?This paper begins to look at this question with brief overview of the concept of bankruptcy costs, traditionally divided between direct and indirect costs. I next turn to a consideration of the process for overseeing bankruptcy costs. I briefly trace the history of court control of compensation in corporate bankruptcy, and then detail the current legal structure. The final part of the chapter then surveys the existing understanding of chapter 11 cost, and concludes with a some thoughts on the important questions that remain unanswered.In short, we know a bit about direct costs, but very little about any other sort of costs. Moreover, what we know is almost entirely lacking in context. This makes it quite hard to understand if the existing system of cost regulation is either useful or justified.","PeriodicalId":437920,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Corporations eJournal","volume":"204 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: How Little We Know\",\"authors\":\"S. Lubben\",\"doi\":\"10.4337/9781781007884.00019\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"For almost as long as there have been bankruptcy laws, there have been complaints that the primary beneficiaries of these laws are insiders who administer the bankruptcy system. In recent decades, this line of criticism has carried with it an implicit criticism of bankruptcy courts, who are urged to more aggressively police the costs of bankruptcy. Indeed, at least one recent critic has unkindly suggested that the failure of the courts to control bankruptcy costs is the result of a corrupt bargain between bankruptcy courts and practitioners. Rarely addressed is why bankruptcy courts regulate professional costs at all. In most areas of American law, a professional is accountable solely to its client. Complaints about excessive cost might result in a separate malpractice action, but a client who thinks they have been overcharged for the defense of their speeding ticket will find little relief in traffic court. Why is bankruptcy different?This paper begins to look at this question with brief overview of the concept of bankruptcy costs, traditionally divided between direct and indirect costs. I next turn to a consideration of the process for overseeing bankruptcy costs. I briefly trace the history of court control of compensation in corporate bankruptcy, and then detail the current legal structure. The final part of the chapter then surveys the existing understanding of chapter 11 cost, and concludes with a some thoughts on the important questions that remain unanswered.In short, we know a bit about direct costs, but very little about any other sort of costs. Moreover, what we know is almost entirely lacking in context. This makes it quite hard to understand if the existing system of cost regulation is either useful or justified.\",\"PeriodicalId\":437920,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law & Society: Public Law - Corporations eJournal\",\"volume\":\"204 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-06-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law & Society: Public Law - Corporations eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007884.00019\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Society: Public Law - Corporations eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781007884.00019","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

几乎只要有破产法,就有人抱怨说,这些法律的主要受益者是管理破产制度的内部人士。近几十年来,这一批评路线隐含着对破产法院的批评,人们敦促破产法院更积极地监管破产成本。事实上,最近至少有一位批评人士不客气地指出,法院未能控制破产成本,是破产法院与从业人员之间腐败交易的结果。很少有人谈到破产法庭为什么要监管专业人员的成本。在美国法律的大多数领域,专业律师只对其委托人负责。对费用过高的投诉可能会导致一个单独的医疗事故诉讼,但如果一个客户认为他们为超速罚单的辩护被多收了钱,那么在交通法庭上就很难找到解脱。破产为什么不同?本文首先简要概述破产成本的概念,传统上破产成本分为直接成本和间接成本。接下来我将讨论监督破产成本的程序。本文简要地追溯了法院控制公司破产赔偿的历史,然后详细介绍了目前的法律结构。然后,本章的最后一部分调查了对第11章成本的现有理解,并对尚未解决的重要问题进行了一些思考。简而言之,我们对直接成本略知一二,但对其他类型的成本却知之甚少。此外,我们所知道的几乎完全缺乏背景。这使得人们很难理解现有的成本监管体系是否有用或是否合理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: How Little We Know
For almost as long as there have been bankruptcy laws, there have been complaints that the primary beneficiaries of these laws are insiders who administer the bankruptcy system. In recent decades, this line of criticism has carried with it an implicit criticism of bankruptcy courts, who are urged to more aggressively police the costs of bankruptcy. Indeed, at least one recent critic has unkindly suggested that the failure of the courts to control bankruptcy costs is the result of a corrupt bargain between bankruptcy courts and practitioners. Rarely addressed is why bankruptcy courts regulate professional costs at all. In most areas of American law, a professional is accountable solely to its client. Complaints about excessive cost might result in a separate malpractice action, but a client who thinks they have been overcharged for the defense of their speeding ticket will find little relief in traffic court. Why is bankruptcy different?This paper begins to look at this question with brief overview of the concept of bankruptcy costs, traditionally divided between direct and indirect costs. I next turn to a consideration of the process for overseeing bankruptcy costs. I briefly trace the history of court control of compensation in corporate bankruptcy, and then detail the current legal structure. The final part of the chapter then surveys the existing understanding of chapter 11 cost, and concludes with a some thoughts on the important questions that remain unanswered.In short, we know a bit about direct costs, but very little about any other sort of costs. Moreover, what we know is almost entirely lacking in context. This makes it quite hard to understand if the existing system of cost regulation is either useful or justified.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信