核心概念

J. McNamara, O. Leimar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章定义并讨论了生物博弈论中的一些核心概念。策略是作为状态函数选择行动的规则,起着关键作用。它解释了理论是如何在策略层面上运作的,而不是试图遵循为它们编码的潜在基因的细节。这被称为“表型策略”,这是讨论和说明。在采用另一种常驻策略的种群中,突变策略的入侵适应度概念也是核心。这种性能度量被用来给出进化稳定性的必要条件,即纳什均衡条件。它解释了如何用更简单的适应度代理(如后代的平均寿命数或净能量增益率)来重新表述这种稳定性条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Central Concepts
The chapter defines and discusses some of the central concepts in biological game theory. Strategies, which are rules for choosing actions as a function of state, play a pivotal role. It is explained how the theory operates at the level of strategies rather than attempting to follow the details of the underlying genetics that code for them. This is referred to as 'the phenotypic gambit', which is discussed and illustrated. The concept of the invasion fitness of a mutant strategy in a population that adopts another resident strategy is also central. This performance measure is used to give a necessary condition for evolutionary stability, formulated as the Nash equilibrium condition. It is explained how this stability condition can be reformulated in terms of simpler fitness proxies such as the mean lifetime number of offspring or the net rate of energy gain.
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