{"title":"论诱导目标一致投资行为的线性契约的最优性","authors":"L. Velthuis, T. Pfeiffer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1027075","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It has become increasingly popular in practice to implement incentive systems that create goal-congruent investment behaviour between central and divisional management. In the following paper, it is shown that only linear contracts enable goal-congruent investment decisions if central management does not have information about the investment project. This might cast a new light on why linear compensation schemes are often used in practice.","PeriodicalId":285784,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the Optimality of Linear Contracts to Induce Goal-Congruent Investment Behavior\",\"authors\":\"L. Velthuis, T. Pfeiffer\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1027075\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It has become increasingly popular in practice to implement incentive systems that create goal-congruent investment behaviour between central and divisional management. In the following paper, it is shown that only linear contracts enable goal-congruent investment decisions if central management does not have information about the investment project. This might cast a new light on why linear compensation schemes are often used in practice.\",\"PeriodicalId\":285784,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1027075\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1027075","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the Optimality of Linear Contracts to Induce Goal-Congruent Investment Behavior
It has become increasingly popular in practice to implement incentive systems that create goal-congruent investment behaviour between central and divisional management. In the following paper, it is shown that only linear contracts enable goal-congruent investment decisions if central management does not have information about the investment project. This might cast a new light on why linear compensation schemes are often used in practice.