{"title":"最近加拿大国防预算趋势和影响的入门","authors":"D. Perry","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V8I0.42514","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Faced with a dangerous world, the federal government has made recapitalizing and updating Canada’s armed forces a priority. Unfortunately, fiscal pressures obliged the government to deviate from its Canada First Defence Strategy, cutting staff and delaying military hardware acquisitions. However, the introduction this year of the Defence Procurement Strategy should allow Ottawa to use improved approaches to buy equipment that would otherwise have been purchased already under the DND’s opaque capital expenditure system. At present, DND capital funds are mostly subject to accrual accounting. Capital costs are charged against the defence budget as annual amortization expenses over equipment lifecycles. While this enables multiple capital projects to go ahead simultaneously, not all of the money covering capital costs is treated this way. Traditional A-Base Vote 5 expenses are still charged to the budget the year the expenditure is made — and the DND consistently underspends the Vote 5 funds available by as much as 28 percent. Since 2007/8, an estimated $6.42 billion wasn’t used as intended. While some of this can be carried forward, there are limits. Leftover funds exceeding them are returned to the Treasury and are thereby lost. It’s up to the DND to make up losses out of future funding. Just as bad, the accrual method doesn’t fully account for inflation, so when schedules slip, project purchasing power diminishes by hundreds of millions of dollars. Ambitious initiatives like the Joint Support Ship and (likely) the Canadian Surface Combatant end up taking hits to reflect harsh budgetary realities; the capabilities of Canada’s soldiers suffer. This policy brief draws on research and confidential interviews to highlight the pressing need for reform in Canadian defence procurement.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"537 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Primer on Recent Canadian Defence Budgeting Trends and Implications\",\"authors\":\"D. Perry\",\"doi\":\"10.11575/SPPP.V8I0.42514\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Faced with a dangerous world, the federal government has made recapitalizing and updating Canada’s armed forces a priority. Unfortunately, fiscal pressures obliged the government to deviate from its Canada First Defence Strategy, cutting staff and delaying military hardware acquisitions. However, the introduction this year of the Defence Procurement Strategy should allow Ottawa to use improved approaches to buy equipment that would otherwise have been purchased already under the DND’s opaque capital expenditure system. At present, DND capital funds are mostly subject to accrual accounting. Capital costs are charged against the defence budget as annual amortization expenses over equipment lifecycles. While this enables multiple capital projects to go ahead simultaneously, not all of the money covering capital costs is treated this way. Traditional A-Base Vote 5 expenses are still charged to the budget the year the expenditure is made — and the DND consistently underspends the Vote 5 funds available by as much as 28 percent. Since 2007/8, an estimated $6.42 billion wasn’t used as intended. While some of this can be carried forward, there are limits. Leftover funds exceeding them are returned to the Treasury and are thereby lost. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
面对一个危险的世界,联邦政府已经把重组和更新加拿大的武装力量作为优先事项。不幸的是,财政压力迫使政府偏离其“加拿大第一防御战略”,裁减人员并推迟军事硬件采购。然而,今年引入的《国防采购战略》应该允许渥太华使用改进的方法来购买设备,否则这些设备将在国防部不透明的资本支出体系下购买。目前,DND资金大多采用权责发生制。资本费用作为装备生命周期内的年度摊销费用记入国防预算。虽然这使得多个资本项目能够同时进行,但并非所有用于支付资本成本的资金都是这样处理的。传统的基础投票费用在支出的那一年仍然会计入预算,而且民主党一直比可用的投票资金少花28%。自2007/8年度以来,估计有64.2亿美元没有按预期使用。虽然其中一些可以继续,但也有限制。超过限额的剩余资金将返还给财政部,从而丢失。国防部要靠未来的资金来弥补损失。同样糟糕的是,权责发生制并没有完全考虑到通货膨胀,所以当进度推迟时,项目购买力就会减少数亿美元。像联合支援舰(Joint Support Ship)和(可能的)加拿大水面战斗舰(Canadian Surface Combatant)这样雄心勃勃的计划最终受到打击,反映出严峻的预算现实;加拿大士兵的能力受到影响。本政策简报借鉴了研究和保密访谈,强调了加拿大国防采购改革的迫切需要。
A Primer on Recent Canadian Defence Budgeting Trends and Implications
Faced with a dangerous world, the federal government has made recapitalizing and updating Canada’s armed forces a priority. Unfortunately, fiscal pressures obliged the government to deviate from its Canada First Defence Strategy, cutting staff and delaying military hardware acquisitions. However, the introduction this year of the Defence Procurement Strategy should allow Ottawa to use improved approaches to buy equipment that would otherwise have been purchased already under the DND’s opaque capital expenditure system. At present, DND capital funds are mostly subject to accrual accounting. Capital costs are charged against the defence budget as annual amortization expenses over equipment lifecycles. While this enables multiple capital projects to go ahead simultaneously, not all of the money covering capital costs is treated this way. Traditional A-Base Vote 5 expenses are still charged to the budget the year the expenditure is made — and the DND consistently underspends the Vote 5 funds available by as much as 28 percent. Since 2007/8, an estimated $6.42 billion wasn’t used as intended. While some of this can be carried forward, there are limits. Leftover funds exceeding them are returned to the Treasury and are thereby lost. It’s up to the DND to make up losses out of future funding. Just as bad, the accrual method doesn’t fully account for inflation, so when schedules slip, project purchasing power diminishes by hundreds of millions of dollars. Ambitious initiatives like the Joint Support Ship and (likely) the Canadian Surface Combatant end up taking hits to reflect harsh budgetary realities; the capabilities of Canada’s soldiers suffer. This policy brief draws on research and confidential interviews to highlight the pressing need for reform in Canadian defence procurement.