{"title":"地方政策制定、全球化联盟与资源配置","authors":"Ling Chen","doi":"10.11126/STANFORD/9781503604797.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter delves into the coalitional politics of policy making and resource allocation by investigating strategies of city government officials. The chapter examines the patterns of bureaucratic competition between international commerce departments and newly emerged domestic technology departments and their respective business clients, including foreign and domestic firms. I explain the influence of FDI attraction on domestic politics by showing (1) how the overlap between FIEs and exporters shaped the degree of perceived threat and the cohesiveness of the vested interests in international commerce under the rule of fragmented bureaucratic competition and (2) how the existence of large foreign firms strengthened the bargaining power of the vested interest bureaucrats against allocating resources to the domestic technology coalition. The direction and the magnitude of foreign influence, therefore, is filtered and channeled through local bureaucracy.","PeriodicalId":128106,"journal":{"name":"Manipulating Globalization","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Local Policy Making, Globalized Coalitions, and Resource Allocation\",\"authors\":\"Ling Chen\",\"doi\":\"10.11126/STANFORD/9781503604797.003.0004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter delves into the coalitional politics of policy making and resource allocation by investigating strategies of city government officials. The chapter examines the patterns of bureaucratic competition between international commerce departments and newly emerged domestic technology departments and their respective business clients, including foreign and domestic firms. I explain the influence of FDI attraction on domestic politics by showing (1) how the overlap between FIEs and exporters shaped the degree of perceived threat and the cohesiveness of the vested interests in international commerce under the rule of fragmented bureaucratic competition and (2) how the existence of large foreign firms strengthened the bargaining power of the vested interest bureaucrats against allocating resources to the domestic technology coalition. The direction and the magnitude of foreign influence, therefore, is filtered and channeled through local bureaucracy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":128106,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Manipulating Globalization\",\"volume\":\"96 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Manipulating Globalization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.11126/STANFORD/9781503604797.003.0004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manipulating Globalization","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.11126/STANFORD/9781503604797.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Local Policy Making, Globalized Coalitions, and Resource Allocation
This chapter delves into the coalitional politics of policy making and resource allocation by investigating strategies of city government officials. The chapter examines the patterns of bureaucratic competition between international commerce departments and newly emerged domestic technology departments and their respective business clients, including foreign and domestic firms. I explain the influence of FDI attraction on domestic politics by showing (1) how the overlap between FIEs and exporters shaped the degree of perceived threat and the cohesiveness of the vested interests in international commerce under the rule of fragmented bureaucratic competition and (2) how the existence of large foreign firms strengthened the bargaining power of the vested interest bureaucrats against allocating resources to the domestic technology coalition. The direction and the magnitude of foreign influence, therefore, is filtered and channeled through local bureaucracy.