透明和有效的CFI执法与英特尔处理器跟踪

Yutao Liu, Peitao Shi, Xinran Wang, Haibo Chen, B. Zang, Haibing Guan
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引用次数: 66

摘要

当前的控制流完整性(CFI)实施方法要么需要检测应用程序可执行文件甚至共享库,要么由于宽松的安全策略而无法防御复杂的攻击,或者两者兼而有之,其中许多方法还会导致高运行时开销。本文指出,针对复杂对手提供透明和强大防御的主要障碍是缺乏足够的运行时控制流信息。为此,本文介绍了FlowGuard,这是一种轻量级、透明的CFI实施方法,通过对英特尔处理器跟踪(IPT)的新颖重用,这是一种最新的硬件功能,可以有效地捕获整个运行时控制流。主要的挑战是IPT是为脱机性能分析和软件调试而设计的,因此对收集到的控制流跟踪进行解码的速度非常慢。FlowGuard通过重建应用程序的保守控制流图(CFG)来解决这一挑战,使其与IPT的压缩编码格式兼容,并在类似模糊的动态训练的帮助下用信用标记CFG边缘。在运行时,FlowGuard将快速和慢速路径分开,以便快速路径将标记的cfg与IPT跟踪进行比较,以进行快速过滤,而慢速路径则对必要的IPT跟踪进行解码,以提高安全性。我们已经在具有IPT支持的商用英特尔Skylake机器上实施和评估了FlowGuard。评估结果表明,FlowGuard在几个应用程序中有效地实施了CFI,同时只引入了很小的性能开销。我们还表明,通过较小的硬件扩展,可以进一步降低性能开销。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Transparent and Efficient CFI Enforcement with Intel Processor Trace
Current control flow integrity (CFI) enforcement approaches either require instrumenting application executables and even shared libraries, or are unable to defend against sophisticated attacks due to relaxed security policies, or both, many of them also incur high runtime overhead. This paper observes that the main obstacle of providing transparent and strong defense against sophisticated adversaries is the lack of sufficient runtime control flow information. To this end, this paper describes FlowGuard, a lightweight, transparent CFI enforcement approach by a novel reuse of Intel Processor Trace (IPT), a recent hardware feature that efficiently captures the entire runtime control flow. The main challenge is that IPT is designed for offline performance analysis and software debugging such that decoding collected control flow traces is prohibitively slow on the fly. FlowGuard addresses this challenge by reconstructing applications' conservative control flow graphs (CFG) to be compatible with the compressed encoding format of IPT, and labeling the CFG edges with credits in the help of fuzzing-like dynamic training. At runtime, FlowGuard separates fast and slow paths such that the fast path compares the labeled CFGs with the IPT traces for fast filtering, while the slow path decodes necessary IPT traces for strong security. We have implemented and evaluated FlowGuard on a commodity Intel Skylake machine with IPT support. Evaluation results show that FlowGuard is effective in enforcing CFI for several applications, while introducing only small performance overhead. We also show that, with minor hardware extensions, the performance overhead can be further reduced.
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