使用可扩展vpn转发蜜罐检测物联网设备的威胁

Amit Tambe, Y. Aung, Ragav Sridharan, Martín Ochoa, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, A. Shabtai, Y. Elovici
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引用次数: 27

摘要

利用物联网(IoT)设备固有漏洞的攻击在过去几年中愈演愈烈。最近的大规模攻击,如Persirai、Hakai等,证实了人们对物联网设备安全性的担忧。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种方法,可以轻松地将商用现成的物联网设备集成到通用的蜜罐架构中。我们的方法将少量异构物联网设备(物理上位于一个位置)投影为互联网上的许多(地理上分布的)设备,使用连接到商业和私人VPN服务。目标是让这些设备被互联网上的攻击发现和利用,从而暴露未知的漏洞。为了检测和检查潜在的恶意流量,我们设计了两种分析策略:(1)给定来自蜜罐的出站连接,回溯到网络流量以检测导致恶意连接的相应攻击命令并使用它来下载恶意软件;(2)使用自适应集群对HTTP请求中未见过的url进行实时检测。我们表明,我们的实施和分析策略能够检测最近针对物联网设备(IoT Reaper, Hakai等)的大规模攻击,总体成本低,维护工作量小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Detection of Threats to IoT Devices using Scalable VPN-forwarded Honeypots
Attacks on Internet of Things (IoT) devices, exploiting inherent vulnerabilities, have intensified over the last few years. Recent large-scale attacks, such as Persirai, Hakai, etc. corroborate concerns about the security of IoT devices. In this work, we propose an approach that allows easy integration of commercial off-the-shelf IoT devices into a general honeypot architecture. Our approach projects a small number of heterogeneous IoT devices (that are physically at one location) as many (geographically distributed) devices on the Internet, using connections to commercial and private VPN services. The goal is for those devices to be discovered and exploited by attacks on the Internet, thereby revealing unknown vulnerabilities. For detection and examination of potentially malicious traffic, we devise two analysis strategies: (1) given an outbound connection from honeypot, backtrack into network traffic to detect the corresponding attack command that caused the malicious connection and use it to download malware, (2) perform live detection of unseen URLs from HTTP requests using adaptive clustering. We show that our implementation and analysis strategies are able to detect recent large-scale attacks targeting IoT devices (IoT Reaper, Hakai, etc.) with overall low cost and maintenance effort.
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