谁站在滑坡的顶端和底部?

Tim Brown, Kristina Rennekamp, Nicholas Seybert, Wenjie Zhu
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引用次数: 18

摘要

先前的研究认为,顺序决策会导致不道德或欺诈行为的滑坡,但几乎没有证据支持这种说法。我们进行了两个实验,证明了在受控环境下滑坡效应的存在,并调查了它是如何导致“好人”(低马基雅维利主义者)做“坏事”的。第一个实验操纵了两个实验任务中夸大个人表现以赚取超额金钱报酬的可能性是增加还是减少。我们发现,低马基雅维利主义者最初的误报动机较小,随后的误报动机较大,导致随后的误报更大。高马基雅维利主义者不会表现出这种滑坡式的行为模式。我们的第二个实验操纵任务之间的时间长度,以检验误报激励对滑坡行为的影响是否会随着误报机会的分离而减少。我们再次观察到在短视界的低ms之间的滑坡现象,而不是在长视界。我们的研究证实了不道德行为的滑坡效应的存在,强调了重要人格特质的个体差异,并表明当个体有频繁的错误报告机会时,滑坡效应行为可能会被放大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Who Stands at the Top and Bottom of the Slippery Slope?
Prior research argues that sequential decisions lead to a slippery slope toward unethical or fraudulent behavior, with little evidence to support such claims. We conduct two experiments which demonstrate the existence of the slippery slope in a controlled setting, and investigate how it leads “good people” (low-Machiavellians) to do “bad things.” The first experiment manipulates whether the potential to overstate personal performance in order to earn excess monetary compensation increases or decreases across two experimental tasks. We find that smaller initial incentives to misreport followed by larger subsequent incentives to misreport lead to greater subsequent misreporting by low-Machiavellians. High-Machiavellians do not exhibit this slippery slope pattern of behavior. Our second experiment manipulates the length of time between tasks to examine whether the effects of misreporting incentives on slippery slope behavior diminish as opportunities to misreport are separated. We again observe slippery slope behavior among low-Ms at the short horizon, but not at the long horizon. Our study confirms the existence of a slippery slope toward unethical behavior, highlights individual differences along an important personality trait, and suggests that slippery slope behavior is likely to be magnified when individuals are presented with frequent opportunities to misreport.
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