封锁执行的政治成本

Fazio Andrea, Reggiani Tommaso, Sabatini Fabio
{"title":"封锁执行的政治成本","authors":"Fazio Andrea, Reggiani Tommaso, Sabatini Fabio","doi":"10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-04","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study how the political cost of enforcing a lockdown in response to the COVID- 19 outbreak relates to citizens’ propensity for altruistic punishment in Italy, the early epicenter of the pandemic. Approval for the government’s management of the crisis decreases with the amount of the penalties that individuals would like to see enforced for lockdown violations. People supporting stronger punishment are more likely to consider the government’s reaction to the pandemic as insufficient. However, after the establishment of tougher sanctions for risky behaviors, we observe a sudden flip in support for government. Higher amounts of the desired fines become associated with a higher probability of considering the government’s policy response as too extreme, lower trust in government, and lower confidence in the truthfulness of the officially provided information. Lockdowns entail a political cost that helps explain why democracies may adopt epidemiologically suboptimal policies.","PeriodicalId":188529,"journal":{"name":"MUNI ECON Working Papers","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"37","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The political cost of lockdown´s enforcement\",\"authors\":\"Fazio Andrea, Reggiani Tommaso, Sabatini Fabio\",\"doi\":\"10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-04\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study how the political cost of enforcing a lockdown in response to the COVID- 19 outbreak relates to citizens’ propensity for altruistic punishment in Italy, the early epicenter of the pandemic. Approval for the government’s management of the crisis decreases with the amount of the penalties that individuals would like to see enforced for lockdown violations. People supporting stronger punishment are more likely to consider the government’s reaction to the pandemic as insufficient. However, after the establishment of tougher sanctions for risky behaviors, we observe a sudden flip in support for government. Higher amounts of the desired fines become associated with a higher probability of considering the government’s policy response as too extreme, lower trust in government, and lower confidence in the truthfulness of the officially provided information. Lockdowns entail a political cost that helps explain why democracies may adopt epidemiologically suboptimal policies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":188529,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"MUNI ECON Working Papers\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"37\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"MUNI ECON Working Papers\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-04\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"MUNI ECON Working Papers","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5817/wp_muni_econ_2021-04","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37

摘要

我们研究了为应对COVID- 19疫情而实施封锁的政治成本与意大利公民利他惩罚的倾向之间的关系,意大利是疫情早期的震中。随着个人希望看到违反封锁规定的处罚力度的增加,对政府危机管理的认可也在减少。支持加大惩罚力度的人更有可能认为政府对疫情的反应不够。然而,在对危险行为实施更严厉的制裁之后,我们观察到对政府的支持突然转变。期望的罚款金额越高,就越有可能认为政府的政策反应过于极端,对政府的信任度越低,对官方提供的信息的真实性的信心也越低。封锁带来了政治成本,这有助于解释为什么民主国家可能采取流行病学上不理想的政策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The political cost of lockdown´s enforcement
We study how the political cost of enforcing a lockdown in response to the COVID- 19 outbreak relates to citizens’ propensity for altruistic punishment in Italy, the early epicenter of the pandemic. Approval for the government’s management of the crisis decreases with the amount of the penalties that individuals would like to see enforced for lockdown violations. People supporting stronger punishment are more likely to consider the government’s reaction to the pandemic as insufficient. However, after the establishment of tougher sanctions for risky behaviors, we observe a sudden flip in support for government. Higher amounts of the desired fines become associated with a higher probability of considering the government’s policy response as too extreme, lower trust in government, and lower confidence in the truthfulness of the officially provided information. Lockdowns entail a political cost that helps explain why democracies may adopt epidemiologically suboptimal policies.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信