知觉经验作为一种跨时间关系

T. Maeda
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引用次数: 1

摘要

根据知觉经验本体论的关系观,知觉经验是知觉者与其客体之间的一种关系。此外,如果它是一个关系,那么它必须是一个跨时间关系。在解释了关系观的主要动机之后,本文考虑了感知经验的本体论本质是否真的可以被解释为一种跨时间的关系,并认为关系观可以反驳基于时间本体论的反对意见,这种本体论以时间滞后论证的形式假设了现在论或永恒论。因此,就时间本体论而言,关系论并没有严重的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Perceptual Experience as a Cross-Time Relation
According to the relational view concerning the ontological nature of perceptual experience, perceptual experience is a relation between the perceiver and its object. Moreover, if it is a relation, then it must be a cross-time relation. After explicating the principal motive for the relational view, this paper considers whether the ontological nature of perceptual experience can really be construed as a cross-time relation, and argues that the relational view can be defended against objections based on a temporal ontology in the form of the time-lag argument which assumes either Presentism or Eternalism. So it is concluded that as far as temporal ontology is concerned the relational view has no serious problem.
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