{"title":"薪酬顾问:他们为谁服务?来自顾问变更的证据","authors":"Ryan G. Chacon, Rachel E. Gordon, Adam S. Yore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3281133","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We use compensation consultant turnover to investigate optimal or excessive CEO compensation recommendations by consultants. Prior literature contends that consultants issue outsized pay recommendations in order to achieve repeat business; we present evidence suggesting their interests are, instead, aligned with shareholders’ desire to appropriately pay the CEO. We find that boards are more likely to dismiss their consultant when CEO pay is abnormally large. These pay-related switches are associated with a decrease in CEO compensation the following year and are concentrated at firms with stronger corporate governance. Lastly, directors representing shareholders’ interests are rewarded with higher votes in annual elections.","PeriodicalId":245576,"journal":{"name":"CSR & Management Practice eJournal","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Compensation Consultants: Whom Do They Serve? Evidence From Consultant Changes\",\"authors\":\"Ryan G. Chacon, Rachel E. Gordon, Adam S. Yore\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3281133\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We use compensation consultant turnover to investigate optimal or excessive CEO compensation recommendations by consultants. Prior literature contends that consultants issue outsized pay recommendations in order to achieve repeat business; we present evidence suggesting their interests are, instead, aligned with shareholders’ desire to appropriately pay the CEO. We find that boards are more likely to dismiss their consultant when CEO pay is abnormally large. These pay-related switches are associated with a decrease in CEO compensation the following year and are concentrated at firms with stronger corporate governance. Lastly, directors representing shareholders’ interests are rewarded with higher votes in annual elections.\",\"PeriodicalId\":245576,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CSR & Management Practice eJournal\",\"volume\":\"99 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-01-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CSR & Management Practice eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3281133\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CSR & Management Practice eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3281133","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Compensation Consultants: Whom Do They Serve? Evidence From Consultant Changes
We use compensation consultant turnover to investigate optimal or excessive CEO compensation recommendations by consultants. Prior literature contends that consultants issue outsized pay recommendations in order to achieve repeat business; we present evidence suggesting their interests are, instead, aligned with shareholders’ desire to appropriately pay the CEO. We find that boards are more likely to dismiss their consultant when CEO pay is abnormally large. These pay-related switches are associated with a decrease in CEO compensation the following year and are concentrated at firms with stronger corporate governance. Lastly, directors representing shareholders’ interests are rewarded with higher votes in annual elections.
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