我们应该相信道德现实主义吗?论道德现实主义在道德分歧中的辩护责任

Shuoning Zhang
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摘要

道德实在论和道德相对主义是道德哲学中有影响的两大教条。本文考察了相对主义在道德分歧问题上的可能立场和一种特殊形式的现实主义的辩护负担。本文的结论是,这两种立场在道德上都是不可接受的,并进一步暗示了一条中间道路:道德实用主义
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
SHOULD WE BELIEVE IN MORAL REALISM? ON THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL REALISM IN MORAL DISAGREEMENTS
Moral realism and moral relativism are two influential dogmas in moral philosophy. This paper examines relativism’s possible position and the burden of justification of a particular form of realism in the problem of moral disagreement. This paper concludes that neither position is morally acceptable, and this paper further offers a hint to a middle way: moral pragmatism
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