{"title":"我们应该相信道德现实主义吗?论道德现实主义在道德分歧中的辩护责任","authors":"Shuoning Zhang","doi":"10.26520/ijtps.2022.6.11.54-62","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Moral realism and moral relativism are two influential dogmas in moral philosophy. This paper examines relativism’s possible position and the burden of justification of a particular form of realism in the problem of moral disagreement. This paper concludes that neither position is morally acceptable, and this paper further offers a hint to a middle way: moral pragmatism","PeriodicalId":150920,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science","volume":"519 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"SHOULD WE BELIEVE IN MORAL REALISM? ON THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL REALISM IN MORAL DISAGREEMENTS\",\"authors\":\"Shuoning Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.26520/ijtps.2022.6.11.54-62\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Moral realism and moral relativism are two influential dogmas in moral philosophy. This paper examines relativism’s possible position and the burden of justification of a particular form of realism in the problem of moral disagreement. This paper concludes that neither position is morally acceptable, and this paper further offers a hint to a middle way: moral pragmatism\",\"PeriodicalId\":150920,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science\",\"volume\":\"519 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.26520/ijtps.2022.6.11.54-62\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26520/ijtps.2022.6.11.54-62","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
SHOULD WE BELIEVE IN MORAL REALISM? ON THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL REALISM IN MORAL DISAGREEMENTS
Moral realism and moral relativism are two influential dogmas in moral philosophy. This paper examines relativism’s possible position and the burden of justification of a particular form of realism in the problem of moral disagreement. This paper concludes that neither position is morally acceptable, and this paper further offers a hint to a middle way: moral pragmatism