债务稳定偏差与泰勒原则:政府债务与通胀持续的新凯恩斯模型中的最优政策

Sven Jari Stehn, D. Vines
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引用次数: 15

摘要

Leith和Wren-Lewis(2007)表明,在最优自由裁量权政策下,新凯恩斯模型中的政府债务会恢复到冲击前的水平。这对货币和财政政策有两个重要影响。首先,在高负债经济体中,酌情制定货币政策的最佳做法可能是降低利率,以应对成本推动的冲击——从而违反泰勒原则——尽管如果通胀明显持续,这将是不正确的。其次,无论通胀持续程度如何,应对此类冲击的最佳财政对策是在谨慎而非承诺的情况下更为积极。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Debt Stabilisation Bias and the Taylor Principle: Optimal Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Government Debt and Inflation Persistence
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that government debt is returned to its pre-shock level in a New Keynesian model under optimal discretionary policy. This has two important implications for monetary and fiscal policy. First, in a high-debt economy, it may be optimal for discretionary monetary policy to cut the interest rate in response to a cost-push shock - thereby violating the Taylor principle - although this will not be true if inflation is significantly persistent. Second, the optimal fiscal response to such a shock is more active under discretion than commitment, whatever the degree of inflation persistence.
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