配给市场中的配置机制

Sumitrra Ganguli, A. Somani, T. Hardy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

经济理论通过对电力系统运行的核心批发市场的设计,在电力系统运行中发挥了重要作用。此外,交易能源将经济理论作为其运作概念的基石,因为它寻求将电力系统的技术需求与参与者的偏好相结合。传统上采用的机制是连续的双重拍卖,但根据电力系统所处的环境,这种机制可能是也可能不是最合适的;也就是说,如果不考虑基础交易环境的特点,就不能推荐一刀切的市场机构。为了更好地理解哪种类型的机制在什么情况下是最合适的,本文解释了指导市场制度选择的经济原理,并在定量电力系统场景的背景下使用理论演示,其中需求超过发电量(由于任何数量的事件,如停电,微电网运行等),电能必须定量配给。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Allocation Mechanisms in Rationed Markets
Economic theory has come to play an important role in power system operations through the design of whole-sale markets that are central to their operation. Furthermore, transactive energy places economic theory as a cornerstone in its operational concept as it seeks to integrate the technical needs of the power system with the preferences of its participants. Traditionally the mechanism employed is the continuous double-auction, but depending on the circumstances in which the power system finds itself, this mechanism may or may not be the most appropriate; that is, a one-size-fits-all market institution cannot be recommended without regard for the features of the underlying trading environment. To better understand which types of mechanisms are most appropriate under what circumstances, this paper explains the economic rationale that guides the choice of a market institution and uses a theoretical demonstration in the context of a rationed power system scenario in which demand exceeds generation (due to any number of events such as outages, microgrid operation, etc.) and electrical energy must be rationed.
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