{"title":"特立尼达和多巴哥的高租金陷阱","authors":"R. Auty, H. I. Furlonge","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198828860.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The development trajectory of high-rent Trinidad and Tobago since the 1960s provides an example of the staple trap model. An extra-parliamentary disturbance combined with large oil windfalls through 1974–78 and 1979–81 to deflect an initially cautious developmental government into executing an overambitious strategy of gas-based industrialization. The economy experienced a growth collapse when oil prices faltered, which was protracted and sharply reduced average incomes. Eventual recovery relied on monetizing natural gas, however, which proved a minimum diversification away from hydrocarbon dependence, testifying to the inertia of rent-seeking once established. Governments need to build a political consensus to deploy rent for efficient economic growth. Chapter 5 shows how Mauritius achieved this.","PeriodicalId":111637,"journal":{"name":"The Rent Curse","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Staple Trap in High-Rent Trinidad and Tobago\",\"authors\":\"R. Auty, H. I. Furlonge\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/OSO/9780198828860.003.0004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The development trajectory of high-rent Trinidad and Tobago since the 1960s provides an example of the staple trap model. An extra-parliamentary disturbance combined with large oil windfalls through 1974–78 and 1979–81 to deflect an initially cautious developmental government into executing an overambitious strategy of gas-based industrialization. The economy experienced a growth collapse when oil prices faltered, which was protracted and sharply reduced average incomes. Eventual recovery relied on monetizing natural gas, however, which proved a minimum diversification away from hydrocarbon dependence, testifying to the inertia of rent-seeking once established. Governments need to build a political consensus to deploy rent for efficient economic growth. Chapter 5 shows how Mauritius achieved this.\",\"PeriodicalId\":111637,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Rent Curse\",\"volume\":\"117 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-12-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Rent Curse\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198828860.003.0004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Rent Curse","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198828860.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The development trajectory of high-rent Trinidad and Tobago since the 1960s provides an example of the staple trap model. An extra-parliamentary disturbance combined with large oil windfalls through 1974–78 and 1979–81 to deflect an initially cautious developmental government into executing an overambitious strategy of gas-based industrialization. The economy experienced a growth collapse when oil prices faltered, which was protracted and sharply reduced average incomes. Eventual recovery relied on monetizing natural gas, however, which proved a minimum diversification away from hydrocarbon dependence, testifying to the inertia of rent-seeking once established. Governments need to build a political consensus to deploy rent for efficient economic growth. Chapter 5 shows how Mauritius achieved this.