{"title":"与参与者相关的奖品竞赛","authors":"Nicolas de Roos, Alexander Matros, V. Smirnov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3804612","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study contests in which the prize depends on the number of participants, and show that equilibrium effort can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the number of participants. This contrasts with the standard result for contests with fixed prizes in which effort is decreasing in the number of participants.","PeriodicalId":198334,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","volume":"220 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contests With Participant-Dependent Prizes\",\"authors\":\"Nicolas de Roos, Alexander Matros, V. Smirnov\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3804612\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study contests in which the prize depends on the number of participants, and show that equilibrium effort can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the number of participants. This contrasts with the standard result for contests with fixed prizes in which effort is decreasing in the number of participants.\",\"PeriodicalId\":198334,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal\",\"volume\":\"220 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-03-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3804612\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Labor: Personnel Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3804612","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study contests in which the prize depends on the number of participants, and show that equilibrium effort can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the number of participants. This contrasts with the standard result for contests with fixed prizes in which effort is decreasing in the number of participants.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
