社会地位与腐败

Political Economy (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-08-21 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1011418

Sebastian Galiani, F. Weinschelbaum

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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们研究了决定腐败程度的社会和经济激励之间的相互作用。用社会奖励来激励公务员可能有助于减少腐败。在我们的模型中，腐败的减少会产生外部性，从而降低聘用公务员的成本。特别是，它降低了避免腐败的工资计划(效率工资)的成本。我们发现，这种外部性的存在降低了一个社会的“最优”腐败水平，社会地位的权力越大，腐败水平越低。

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Social Status and Corruption

We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. In our model, a decrease in corruption produces an externality that reduces the cost of hiring civil servants. In particular, it makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We show that the existence of this externality reduces the “optimal” level of corruption in a society, the greater the power of social status, the lower the level of corruption.

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来源期刊

Political Economy (Topic)

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