基于博弈论的环境违法监测与分析

2013 5th International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks Pub Date : 2013-09-27 DOI:10.1109/CICN.2013.129

Yong Zhu, Zheng Li

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引用次数: 0

摘要

环境管理制度的难点在于对环境违法行为的监测和监督，本文构建了监管机构与排污企业之间的囚徒困境博弈模型。研究表明，随着处罚力度的加大，监管频率的提高可以有效减少违法污染行为，从而有助于提高政府环境治理水平。

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Environmental Violations Monitoring and Analysis Based on Game Theory

The difficulty of the environmental management system is that the monitoring and supervision of the environmental violations, the paper constructs a model of Prisoner's Dilemma Game between regulators and sewage companies. Studies have shown that the regulatory frequency with the increase of penalties can effectively reduce illegal polluting behavior, thus helping to improve the level of government environmental governance.

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2013 5th International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks

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