Weak States and Terrorist Organizations: A Proposed Model of Intervention

The war on terrorism in the post 9/11 reality brings constant challenges to jurists. One of these challenges deals with terrorist organizations like al-Qaida that build terrorist infrastructure in various parts of the Third World, such as in Africa and the Middle East where the central government is either weak or absent. Be it in parts of Sudan or in Yemen the vast areas that give ample hiding ground for terrorists coupled with a weak government that can’t stop Al-Qaida make them a heaven for terrorists. This article raises the question what can be done in such a scenario? What tools does a government combating al-Qaida have when terrorists find a safe haven in remote parts of the globe far away from the control of a government, which might be sympathetic to the war on terrorism but for geo-political reasons lack the will and means to drive Al-Qaida away. We argue that in a situation where a state does not have the ability to control parts of its territory taken by terrorists which are using it as a base of operation to launch attacks on a third state, this failure to act raises the right of self-defense to the attacked party. When a state loses its sovereignty to a terrorist organization and it cannot fulfill its duties, it forfeits some of the privileges that sovereignty entails. However since this inaction is not a voluntary one, the actions against the terrorist organization thus infringing on the sovereignty of the weak state should be gradual and allow the weak state the opportunity to resume its capacity as a sovereign state. We suggested a list of tactical measures that have a lesser effect on sovereignty and allow the weak state to choose between acting against the terrorist entity or allowing the intervening force to do so on its behalf.