处理、转储还是出口?国内和国际废物管理政策如何影响废物链的结果

Sytske Wijnsma, D. Lauga, L. B. Toktay
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引用次数: 0

摘要

非法或不需要的废物处理方法,例如倾倒和出口,在实践中普遍存在。为了尽量减少这些方法的负面影响,政策制定者实施了旨在打击这些方法的法律和法规。即便如此,由于公司和专有信息之间的高度异质性使得监管不完善,违规行为仍然猖獗。分散的废物处理链是该部门的一种常见的企业间组织形式,它使这一问题复杂化,因为企业对其他废物链合作伙伴的信息也有限,这在企业行为和政策干预之间造成了复杂的相互作用。在此背景下,我们分别分析了针对倾销和出口的国内和国际废物法规对企业激励和合规的影响。我们开发了一个双层废物链,一个是产生废物的制造商,一个是处理废物的运营商。制造商的废物质量和处理运营商的效率是私人信息。两者都可以通过违反规定来避免合规成本,制造商可以安排废物出口,运营商可以倾倒废物。我们描述了平衡浪费结果,并检查了监管气候的影响。我们的分析表明,主要侧重于惩罚处理运营商的倾倒可能会恶化废物链的结果。在实践中,一种常见的干预措施是只关注于惩罚低质量的废物出口,这也可能适得其反。相反,应该考虑惩罚下游倾销的制造商。此外,应减少废物质量水平之间的出口负担不对称,这既提高了废物产出,也提高了处理经营者的利润。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Treat, Dump, or Export? How Domestic and International Waste Management Policies Shape Waste Chain Outcomes
Illegal or unwanted waste disposal methods such as dumping and export are prevalent in practice. To minimize the negative impact of these methods, policymakers have implemented laws and regulations designed to combat them. Even so, violations are rampant as a high degree of heterogeneity between firms and proprietary information render monitoring imperfect. Decentralized waste disposal chains, a common form of inter-business organization in this sector, compound this problem as firms also have limited information available on the other waste chain partner, which creates complex interactions between firm behavior and policy interventions. Against this background, we analyze the effects of domestic and international waste regulations targeting dumping and export, respectively, on firm incentives and compliance. We develop a two-tier waste chain with a manufacturer that generates waste and an operator that treats it. The manufacturer's waste quality and the treatment operator's efficiency are private information. Both can avoid compliance cost by violating regulations where the manufacturer can arrange for the export of the waste and the operator can dump it. We characterize equilibrium waste outcomes and examine the impact of the regulatory climate. Our analysis reveals that primarily focusing on penalizing dumping by treatment operators can worsen waste chain outcomes. Solely focusing on penalizing low-quality waste exports, a common intervention in practice, can also backfire. Instead, penalizing manufacturers for downstream dumping should be given consideration. In addition, the asymmetry in export burden between waste quality levels should be reduced, which improves both waste outcomes and treatment operator profits.
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