数字数量:量化文本披露是否降低了信息风险?

John L. Campbell, Xin Zheng, Dexin Zhou
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引用次数: 3

摘要

理论研究认为,数字传达的信息比文字更精确。在此基础上,我们假设当管理者提供定量信息的比例越大,信息风险就会降低,企业价值就会增加。我们提供了三个主要发现。首先,在控制收益电话会议中的现金流新闻之后,我们发现硬信息(即数字披露)的程度与电话会议周围的短窗口股票回报之间存在正相关关系。这一结果表明,当管理者提供更多的数字披露时,信息风险降低。其次,我们发现当企业的信息环境较差时,这种正相关关系更大。最后,我们发现,当企业业绩的不确定性较高时(即,当企业发布负收益意外时),这种正相关关系更大。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,投资者会对财报电话会议中硬信息(即数字披露)的程度做出反应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Number of Numbers: Does Quantitative Textual Disclosure Reduce Information Risk?
Theoretical research argues that numbers convey more precise information than words. Based on this work, we hypothesize that when managers provide disclosure with a greater proportion of quantitative information, information risk will decrease and firm value will increase. We offer three main findings. First, after controlling for the cash flow news in earnings conference calls, we find a positive association between the extent of hard information (i.e., numerical disclosure) and short-window stock returns around the call. This result suggests that information risk decreases when managers provide greater numerical disclosure. Second, we find that this positive association is larger when firms’ information environment is otherwise poor. Finally, we find that this positive association is larger when uncertainty about firm performance is higher (i.e., when the firm issues a negative earnings surprise). Overall, our results suggest that investors react to the extent of hard information (i.e., numerical disclosure) in earnings conference calls.
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