免费最后一次斯塔克尔伯格差分游戏

Chiara Brambilla, L. Grosset
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了Stackelberg微分对策的一个新公式。我们假设领导者不仅可以控制游戏的动态,还可以控制编程间隔的长度。自由最终时间Stackelberg微分对策的这种公式在文献中没有明确考虑,并提出了一些有趣的问题。在给出这类微分对策的正式定义之后,我们用一个实际的例子来说明与这个新定义相关的主要困难。我们以提出与这个问题有关的两个悬而未决的问题来结束这篇文章。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Free final time Stackelberg differential games
In this paper, we analyse a new formulation of Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the Leader can control not only the dynamics of the game, but also the length of the programming interval. This formulation of a free final time Stackelberg differential game is not explicitly considered in the literature and presents some interesting issues. After a formal definition of this kind of differential game, we show, using a practical example, the main difficulties associated with this new definition. We close the article by presenting two open questions related to this issue.
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