非分配约束及其执行对企业家选择、价格和质量的影响

P. Brhlikova, A. Ortmann
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引用次数: 6

摘要

我们研究了在何种条件下具有代表性的企业家创办非营利性企业是理性的。本文以Glaeser和Shleifer(2001)提出的创业选择模型为出发点,分析了非分配约束执行不力对创业选择、产品价格和质量的影响。我们发现,如果非分配约束的执行较弱,非营利组织形式对企业家的吸引力就会明显增强。我们还发现,在执法不力的情况下,非营利机构的质量低于执法严格的非营利机构,但高于营利性机构的质量。我们讨论了我们的结果的含义和局限性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Impact of the Non-Distribution Constraint and its Enforcement on Entrepreneurial Choice, Price, and Quality
We study the conditions under which it is rational for a representative entrepreneur to start a nonprofit firm. Taking as point of departure a model of entrepreneurial choice proposed by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), we analyze consequences of weak enforcement of the non-distribution constraint on entrepreneurial choice and price and quality of the product. We find that the nonprofit organizational form becomes unequivocally more attractive to entrepreneurs if enforcement of the non-distribution constraint is weak. We also nd that the quality delivered by nonprofit firms is lower under weak enforcement than that of the nonprofit firm under strict enforcement, but higher than the quality delivered by a for-prot rm. We discuss the implications and limitations of our results.
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