{"title":"知识启示中的道德风险","authors":"P. S. Faynzilberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2614814","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We formulate and solve the problem of optimal mechanism-design by a principal facing adverse selection and moral hazard from different sources. The parties’ decision problem is comprised of a publicly observable collective choice and a partially private social choice. As in agency with pure adverse selection, the individual rationality of the parties’ replies to a mechanism is characterized by the truth-telling, the participation, and the abstention conditions, but the communications of each party with the mechanism-designer are subject to moral hazard from the hidden actions taken by the rest. The Implementation Principle (Faynzilberg, 2000) remains valid: the designer’s focus on individually-rational knowledge-revealing mechanisms is without loss of optimality. Mediation of voluntary collective choice necessitates a departure from the received mechanism-design methodology, a detailed comparison with which is also provided.","PeriodicalId":305946,"journal":{"name":"AARN: Economic Systems (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Hazard in the Revelation of Knowledge\",\"authors\":\"P. S. Faynzilberg\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2614814\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We formulate and solve the problem of optimal mechanism-design by a principal facing adverse selection and moral hazard from different sources. The parties’ decision problem is comprised of a publicly observable collective choice and a partially private social choice. As in agency with pure adverse selection, the individual rationality of the parties’ replies to a mechanism is characterized by the truth-telling, the participation, and the abstention conditions, but the communications of each party with the mechanism-designer are subject to moral hazard from the hidden actions taken by the rest. The Implementation Principle (Faynzilberg, 2000) remains valid: the designer’s focus on individually-rational knowledge-revealing mechanisms is without loss of optimality. Mediation of voluntary collective choice necessitates a departure from the received mechanism-design methodology, a detailed comparison with which is also provided.\",\"PeriodicalId\":305946,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"AARN: Economic Systems (Sub-Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"AARN: Economic Systems (Sub-Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2614814\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AARN: Economic Systems (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2614814","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We formulate and solve the problem of optimal mechanism-design by a principal facing adverse selection and moral hazard from different sources. The parties’ decision problem is comprised of a publicly observable collective choice and a partially private social choice. As in agency with pure adverse selection, the individual rationality of the parties’ replies to a mechanism is characterized by the truth-telling, the participation, and the abstention conditions, but the communications of each party with the mechanism-designer are subject to moral hazard from the hidden actions taken by the rest. The Implementation Principle (Faynzilberg, 2000) remains valid: the designer’s focus on individually-rational knowledge-revealing mechanisms is without loss of optimality. Mediation of voluntary collective choice necessitates a departure from the received mechanism-design methodology, a detailed comparison with which is also provided.