对惯犯的制裁:财富问题?

ERN: Primary Taxonomy (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-06 DOI:10.1111/sjpe.12126

Wolfgang Eggert, Steffen Minter, M. Stephan, Handirk von Ungern‐Sternberg

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在两期标准执法模型中，个人要么遵守法律，要么违法。此外，个人可能会无意中冒犯他人。当制裁受到个人财富约束的限制时，政府会选择对初犯和惯犯的适当制裁以及监控水平。我们假设一个以福利为导向的政府，并根据个人财富水平推导出恒定、增加和减少制裁的亚博弈完美均衡。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Sanctions for Repeat Offenders: A Question of Wealth?

In a two-period standard law-enforcement model, individuals observe or break the law. In addition, individuals may offend accidentally. When sanctions are limited by individual wealth constraints, the government chooses appropriate sanctions for first and repeat offenders and the level of monitoring. We assume a welfare-oriented government and derive subgame-perfect equilibria for constant, increasing and decreasing sanctions depending on the individual wealth level.

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ERN: Primary Taxonomy (Topic)

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