用于边道分析和逆向工程的电磁泄漏实际操作提取

Pieter Robyns, Mariano Di Martino, Dennis Giese, W. Lamotte, P. Quax, G. Noubir
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引用次数: 7

摘要

确定黑箱设备正在执行哪些操作是逆向工程中需要解决的一个重要挑战。此外,为了对上述操作进行成功的侧信道分析(SCA),必须确定它们的精确定时。在本文中,我们在对NodeMCU美国物联网设备进行电磁(EM)分析的背景下解决了这两个挑战。更具体地说,我们提出了一个卷积神经网络(CNN)架构,该架构旨在将NodeMCU执行的操作从一组8种可能的操作中分类,即OpenSSL AES,本机AES, TinyAES, OpenSSL DES, SHA1- prf, HMAC-SHA1, SHA1和SHA1Transform。此外,我们使用相同的体系结构来预测操作的开始和结束时间,从而消除了在SCA中修改固件或手动触发器的需要。我们的方法使用66gb数据集进行评估,该数据集包含69,632条复杂的电磁泄漏痕迹,由USRP B210软件定义无线电捕获。该方法的最佳变体实现了96.47%的分类准确率,并且能够在平均34秒内预测操作的开始和结束时间。我们将我们的方法与经典模板匹配进行比较,并向社区提供我们的开源实现和数据集,以便可以复制所取得的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Practical operation extraction from electromagnetic leakage for side-channel analysis and reverse engineering
Determining which operations are being executed by a black-box device is an important challenge to tackle in reverse engineering. Furthermore, in order to perform a successful side-channel analysis (SCA) of said operations, their precise timing must be determined. In this paper, we tackle these two challenges in context of an electromagnetic (EM) analysis of a NodeMCU Amica IoT device. More specifically, we propose a convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture that is designed to classify operations performed by the NodeMCU out of a set of 8 possible operations, namely OpenSSL AES, native AES, TinyAES, OpenSSL DES, SHA1-PRF, HMAC-SHA1, SHA1, and SHA1Transform. In addition, we use the same architecture to predict the start and end times of the operation, thereby removing the need for firmware modifications or manual triggers in SCA. Our approach is evaluated using a 66 GB dataset containing 69,632 complex traces of EM leakage, captured with a USRP B210 software defined radio. The best variant of our methodology achieves a classification accuracy of 96.47%, and is able to predict the start and end times of the operation within 34 |is of the ground truth on average. We compare our methodology to classical template matching, and provide our open-source implementation and datasets to the community so that the achieved results can be reproduced.
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